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As one of the actual participants in the opening to China in the early 1970s, I was the special assistant to Henry Kissinger at National Security Council. Mao Zedong invited Richard Nixon for the meeting, Nixon asked Kissinger to go with him. I was one of the three delegation members in that meeting - the other two were Nixon and Kissinger. 

Because of the experience of that era, I believe that the late 1960s and early 1970s were a successful period of great strategy for the US. When Nixon and Kissinger took office, they faced a very difficult situation abroad and at home. It took a grand strategy to emerge from these situations and to establish successful foreign policy overseas. We were in a tense relationship with the Soviet Union, we had no relationship with China, and we were bogged down in a very lengthy war in Vietnam. 

At home, there were riots, assassinations and protests due to the unpopularity of the war, and in order to show that American diplomacy could still be effective, Nixon and Kissinger crafted a strategy which sought to open up China. In doing so, this grand strategy would improve relations with both China and the Soviet Union and it would pressure the North Vietnamese, who received aid from these countries, to negotiate seriously for a peace settlement.

The grand strategy worked very well. We began a fruitful relationship with China and also immediately improved relations with the Soviet Union. We had better relations with each than they had with one another. And after a couple of years, the US reached a peace settlement with the North Vietnamese. This showed that American diplomacy was not hamstrung by the war and other problems, that we could be active on the world stage, and it also improved the morale of the American people. They could see that we were opening up a huge country, even though we had ambiguously withdrawn from a small part of Southeast Asia.

If the US had not first initiated the process, I was not certain that China would approach the US for reconciliation. After all, China and America had fought in the Korean War (1950-53) and had not been in touch for 22 years. But when we saw the increasing tensions between Moscow and Beijing, particularly due to the border clashes in 1969, we thought that China might be interested in dealing with us to balance the threat from the Soviet Union. Judging from the diplomatic environment that China faced at that time, we thought that China might be interested in opening up to the US because it could lead them into United Nations membership, and subsequently allow them to expand relations with other countries in Asia and Europe. As a result, we thought China had the incentive to deal with us, but we could not be sure, so that's why Nixon sent Kissinger and myself to China in July of 1971 to make sure there was sufficient common interest in new relations to justify a presidential visit the next year.

Opening to China was a classic win-win. Like the US, China achieved its primary goals. Both sides won. 

President Jimmy Carter established formal diplomatic relations with China. I think President Carter's move was not as bold as President Nixon's move to open up China in the early 1970s, but it still took considerable leadership and courage by President Carter to make the relationship official because it meant switching our diplomatic relations from Taiwan, which had been our ally for many years, to China. This change was not inevitable. There were many people in the US who opposed this move. Congress also passed the Taiwan Relations Act. Overall, this was greeted positively in the US despite the pain we felt from putting Taiwan in an awkward position.

The entire opening process took place in a clandestine manner. This is starkly different from President Donald Trump's approach to foreign policy on Twitter. There was a particular need in the China opening to have some secrecy so that we could have candid discussions and ensure there was a certain amount of agreement before we went public with our initiatives. Nixon's foreign policy reflected a much more careful and strategic approach than we see today. Trump acts by instinct on Twitter, and he often makes quick decisions without consulting his advisors, and he often acts against their view without careful planning or preparation. We need a more measured approach. We need a strategy; this is not changing our views all the time based on the president's self-interest as opposed to national interest.

There are three main elements that any administration needs for successful foreign policy toward not only Asia, but the world. And this is particularly true of our China policy.

First, we need to be strong at home. We cannot be in these constant bitter fights between the left and the right. We need to invest in our future. We ought to be cooperating on legislation that invests in advanced science and technology, infrastructure, education and other areas. These steps would make America more competitive and showcase our democratic political system.         

Second, we must work with our friends and our allies. We have a great advantage over China in this regard, but the current administration is picking fights with our allies, such as through trade disputes. If President Trump was cooperating with our allies, he would have greater leverage. 

Third, we must supplement our own leadership with international cooperation and multilateral institutions. America needs to galvanize and assemble coalitions to solve problems. The president has destroyed our ability to work multilaterally. He pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was economically good for American business and jobs and would have signaled American leadership in Asia. He also pulled out of the Iran deal which was constraining the Iran nuclear program. Above all, he pulled out of the Paris agreement, ending a key area of US-China cooperation in this respect.

Despite the difficult relationship we now have as countries, there is still great affection in America for Chinese people, culture, and cuisine.

The author is former US ambassador to China. The Chinese version of his new book Kissinger on Kissinger: Reflections on Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Leadership will be released in China in 2020. Zhang Juan and Michael Cerny from US-China Perception Monitor contribute to this article. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn