Illustration: Liu Rui
State oil company PetroVietnam has signed a deal with Russia's energy giant Gazprom, planning to jointly develop Vietnam's two offshore blocks, which are located in the South China Sea. Despite reports say that the two blocks are not within the area of the sea disputed with China, however, it is an obvious move for Vietnam to strengthen cooperation with Russia in order to gain more chips against its neighbor.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said Tuesday that "China hoped companies from countries outside the South China Sea region would respect and support efforts made by directly concerned parties in resolving disputes through bilateral negotiations." Liu responded in a rather polite way.
Gazprom is a state-owned company and its behavior can largely be seen as representing the attitude of the Russian government, although its cooperation with Vietnamese companies is probably only to make money this time. Not only the Chinese public but the world feels this way.
The Chinese people expect respect from Russia for their rights and feelings. It is not too much to ask and we always believe it is what we can get from Russia.
China and Russia have long been strategic partners but the relation between major powers always has its weakness. Only when both China and Russia pay attention to care for this relationship would other outsiders not be able to find opportunities to damage the mutual trust between us two.
Recently, former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and other members of the US elite have been addressing the importance of the US increasing its ties with Russia. Meanwhile, there are also some pro-Western scholars in Russia who have said their country should move closer to the US. All the voices have created a more complex geopolitical outlook, increasing uncertainties in Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.
China and Russia should be aware of the importance of a stable Sino-Russian relationship for the maintenance of the two countries' strategic interests. The more stable the strategic relationship is, the more advantages China and Russia gain when dealing with the Western countries. It is vital to two countries because both of them cannot be unconditional friends of the West in the near future.
In other words, if Sino-Russian strategic mutual trust goes wrong, the importance of China and Russia will both be devalued to the West.
South China Sea is China's most intractable geopolitical conflict point at present. Vietnam and the Philippines are both trying to seek help from countries outside the region, making the bilateral negotiations into a multilateral confrontation. China cannot be too cautious about any other superpower's involvement in the South China Sea region.
Russia should not send any wrong or ambiguous signals about the South China Sea. It will not only make the dispute even more difficult to settle for China, but also raise doubts about Russia's real intention behind the gas deal. To be honest, Russia's popularity among the Chinese public fell immediately when the news came out.
Will Moscow, through this gas deal, have more choices when maintaining a strategic relationship with China? Will Gazprom's cooperation with Vietnam lead to this kind of result, even though it is not their original expectation? The Chinese people cannot be comfortable when these doubts appear.
China attaches great importance to the Sino-Russian strategic relationship, but it is not something to be begged from Russia. Changes after the Cold War made the two countries clearer about where their own strategic interests lie.
The actual significance of the gas deal between Russia and Vietnam is limited. However, we can always get a glimpse of the great wisdom and vision of a country through very little things. We believe that Russians' strategic thinking can take good care of all the challenges of their country in the future.
The article is an editorial published in the Chinese edition of the Global Times Wednesday. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn
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