The resignation of Kofi Annan, the joint UN-Arab League special envoy for Syria, originally dampened any hope for a political solution to the crisis in Syria.

Many felt that a breakthrough was not going to happen any time soon. The reasons, of course, are many. One is a lack of unity in the Security Council over what to do with Syria.

Russia does not want to lose its sphere of political influence in the Middle East, which centers around Syria, and it abhors the thought of Syria being host to Turkish tanks, politicians, investors, and military experts when and if the regime is changed.

That is why Moscow has made it clear that it will never tolerate unilateral Turkish military action in Syria, destroying any possibility of a Turkish buffer zone. It might be tolerate co-sharing Syria with the Americans, but will not allow Damascus to fall under the total influence of the US.

Many have put out suggestions for Syria's projected "soft" landing. All of them, to date, have been turned down by Syrian officialdom, and frequently by the Syrian opposition as well.

Early presidential elections, before the year is out, are not an option for President Bashar al-Assad, who claims they cannot happen so long as "armed groups" roam the streets of Syria.

Transferring powers to Vice President Farouk al-Shara, as originally requested by the Arab League, is also off the table, and so is delegating powers to a joint civilian-military council, while maintaining Assad symbolically, until his term expires in July 2014.

At the end of the day, we should not overestimate how much influence Moscow has on Damascus. They have learned their lesson well from the Turks, who were conceived as "best friends" for Assad back in 2010-11. Yet when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan tried to push for political reforms, he was cut off by Damascus.

Russia realizes that if it pushes too hard for a step-down, or rotation of power, then its calls would fall on deaf ears in Damascus.

Wanting to maintain the leverage it already has, Moscow has refused to make change happen.

Russia actually pushed for the Arab League observers, and then for the Annan mission, with the aim of easing the tension on Assad and "undoing" the damage done to his image.

Moscow's objective was to show that Assad was not solely responsible for the dramatic death toll in Syria. It reasoned that the more he was demonized in the media, the more difficult it would be to talk him into any deal - let alone a dignified exit.

The regime remains much stronger - despite all setbacks - than any of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring.

The Syrian army, despite defections, is still carrying out orders from the president, and is engaged in a fierce battle with the FSA in Aleppo. Government ministers are still operating in Damascus, despite the defection of Prime Minister Riad Hijab, and that state is still paying wages to its massive bureaucracy.

Hours after Hijab's defection this August, in an attempt to prove that it is unaffected by his walk-out, Syria appointed Health Minister Wael Halaki, a member of the Central Committee of the ruling Baath Party, as premier.

The choice of a Baathist, yet again, is intentional. There are no political concessions being made. Despite that, the anti-regime demonstrations continue, and so does the regime's suppression.

This status quo cannot last forever. Syria has already become a liability for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is coming under immense pressure from the international community to help end the violence and start a political process that would lead to democracy.

He is believed to have been given a mandate by the US that starts now and lasts anywhere until after a new president is sown into the White House next January. If the regime remains firmly in power by then, there probably will be a military strike, mandated by the Friends of Syria Coalition, with or without the UN.

If it happens, Moscow cannot go to war to prevent it. Its only leverage, after all, is its UN veto.

Originally, Annan's mission had Russia's fingerprints all over it, and was aimed exclusively at talking the Syrians into such a deal. That did not happen, namely because neither the regime itself was interested in a cease-fire, and nor were the Syrian rebels.

Each was seemingly convinced that "victory" was just around the corner, snubbing Annan rather completely, to make it happen.

Now, Moscow is trying, yet again, to apply real pressure on the Syrians to do things differently.



The author is a Syrian political analyst based in Beirut. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

Sunnis are no problem

Wang Lian, a Middle East expert with the School of International Studies at Peking University

Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab's recent defection is a heavy blow to Bashar Assad's regime.

This is because Hijab was no ordinary diplomat or military figure, but a senior official entrusted to take care of the country's affairs. His defection will be seen as symbolic, or even a "turning point" for the Assad regime.

Hijab's relatively smooth defection from Damascus to Jordan, then to the rebel camp, is also a sign that Assad's grip over Syria has become much weaker than before.

Hijab's departure may trigger a chain reaction among high-ranking Syrian officers. Given that Assad's own survival is also in serious doubt as pressure builds, the effectiveness of his control is in doubt.

However, Hijab's defection has little to do with the factional tensions between Sunnis, which Hijab belongs to, and the ruling Alawites. Current revolt has little to do with factional conflicts though it has been portrayed as such.

Assad's appointment of Oman Ghalawanji, another Sunni Muslim, as the country's interim prime minister at this critical time also demonstrated that sectarianism is not a major issue. Assad still wants Sunni support.

Assad still rests easy

Wang Guoxiang, an observer of Middle East politics based in Syria

The Syrian government has sought Sunni support ever since former Syrian leader Hafez Assad, father of Bashar, took power. Several important portfolios, including the prime minister and minister of defense, were held by Sunnis back then, and this legacy continues.

Hijab's defection has little to do with sectarian clashes between Sunnis and Alawites. In fact, Hijab enjoyed great freedom and trust in the Alawite-dominated Syrian government, which is why he can escape to Jordan without much difficulty.

However, what is more interesting is that Assad has now appointed another Sunni Muslim, Oman Ghalawanji, as the country's acting prime minister.

Hijab's move, as well as previous defections of Syrian diplomats, was actually driven by the huge amount of money paid by some Gulf countries.

Hijab's move will not have any significant impact on the Assad regime. Despite losing several of its top security chiefs to recent attacks, Assad's army has still managed to make major progress in battles in Damascus and Aleppo. Assad has 220,000 trained soldiers equipped with heavy artillery and is prepared for a prolonged war. The rebels only have some 30,000 men and many lack proper military training.

The Syrian economy also remains fairly independent and can survive under Western sanctions.