In the article, "Carrier not right envoy for South Pacific," published in the Global Times on August 30, my colleague Jin Canrong criticized the recent visit by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the Cook Islands. Clinton's visit, where she attended the 43rd meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum, included the presence of warships, which concerned Jin. There are grounds for criticizing the militarization of American foreign policy, but perhaps this occasion was less bellicose than it appears.

A US secretary of state does not fly economy to remote destinations, then wheel her roller suitcase through the terminal to join the queue for taxis. The secretary travels with a train of equipment and persons modest only by comparison with US presidential displacements, which rival across time the most ostentatious of Chinese emperors. The secretary has to be ready for all contingencies.

Jin mentioned aircraft carriers, the vessel of choice of the US navy. The navy has more admirals than ships, and these able officers are kept busy precisely by the vulnerability of the carriers. Costing some $50 billion for the vessel alone, the ships can be damaged or destroyed by floating mines, submarine attacks and missiles of all sorts.

In one recent exercise, a swarm of small boats threatened a carrier. In another, frogmen in magnetic footwear climbed undetected to the carrier's deck. There is an old American adage, "The bigger they are, the harder they fall."

Jin thinks the secretary should use a more subtle calling card than a warship. I have no doubt that is what she thinks, too. But US presidents, secretaries of state and defense and even CIA directors are not free to devise their own policies.

They inherit the inertia of a vast foreign policy and military establishment. US admirals and generals are not overly concerned who is president, even though the incumbent bears the proud title of commander in chief.

Quite apart from the armed forces, there are diplomats, intelligence officers, other federal officials, congressional staffs, tens of thousands of people in total. There are supporting casts of academics, commentators, journalists, equally in the thousands and often anxiously seeking governmental appointment. There are veterans of disasters past, qualified by age to claim the honorific designation of "wise men" and now joined by "wise women."

Next come the lobbyists for a myriad of economic and ideological interests. Years ago, as former US president Ronald Reagan pitched his strategic defense initiative, a senior military officer asked whether missiles could protect the American heaven. No, was the answer, but every congressional district will be covered with a contract.

Amid the organized chaos of avarice and ambition, old ideas and enduring illusions, the president and his senior officials may address other nations sternly. They doubt that their own bureaucrats will tolerate new policies which threaten familiar routines and entrench privileges.

The point of much of US foreign policy is not only to influence foreign governments and people. It is to reassure the US electorate of something it occasionally and wisely doubts, that the president and secretary of state determine events.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 claimed the Western hemisphere for the US. Washington's inverted version of it for Asia informs China that it cannot claim similar privileges in its geopolitical sphere.

The reinforcement of military ties with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, the enlistment of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as new allies are intended to define relations with China.

The new strategic design absurdly devalues existing cultural, economic and social relationships between our nations. Incidentally, if the US were to follow in the Caribbean what we recommend to China off its coasts, it would re-open diplomatic relations with Cuba. The American critics of the country's imperial habits understand the concerns of our Chinese interlocutors. We believe that there are other ways to influence US policy than directly addressing governments imprisoned by our own historical contradictions.

The author is professor emeritus of Georgetown University Law Center. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn