North Korea's third nuclear test is neither surprising nor likely to be the last from a leadership determined to try to shape the country's future on its own terms.

North Korea is still pursuing the dream of being both strong and prosperous; when in reality it is neither.

Missile launches and nuclear tests may be useful for bolstering national pride, reinforcing regime legitimacy domestically, and forcing the international community to acknowledge its technical accomplishments. But these will not secure the regime's long-term viability, nor deliver the prosperity that has now also become part of the legitimacy equation for Kim Jong-un's leadership.

What is North Korea betting on? One element in the short run has to be that China will not pull the plug on regime stability by significantly curtailing oil shipments or cross-border trade that are essential for North Korea's economy and domestic stability. 

Another is that after some period of bluster and punitive sanctions, the international community led by the US, South Korea and Japan, will eventually tolerate North Korea being a de facto nuclear state and turn their attention to reducing proliferation risks.

 If both these predictions turn out to be true, North Korea will most likely continue to bargain for economic benefits and regime recognition in return for concessions on a nonproliferation agenda that does not diminish its deterrence capabilities, while seeking a new accommodation with South Korea to repair relations to the extent it can on terms that maintain North Korea's national pride and regime survival interests. 

Whether or not this process will lead to a peace regime that provides a new security framework for the Korean Peninsula remains a wide-open question, as the eventual endgame of the increasingly complex competition between the two Koreas is also ultimately tethered to the future of US-China relations.

Whether North Korea will win this bet is far from certain. 

Sanctions that succeed in denying foreign exchange to the regime further complicate trade, and limit the import of luxury goods to support the rising expectations of the Pyongyang elite, which could stymie both the regime's economic development plans and its ability to sustain loyalty from a middle class that increasingly values money more than ideological acquiescence and patronage.

Also, internal tensions resulting from continuing high inflation and reluctance to pursue economic reform that would elicit the supply responses from households and enterprises that are essential for the success of any reform initiative, could well erode confidence in Kim Jong-un's ability to deliver the economic improvements that have been a cornerstone of his publicly stated intentions.

Broad-based disillusionment with the decisions and policies of the young leader would not augur well for the future. 

Social cohesion has already been weakened by the increased individuation that comes with growing reliance on a market economy mechanisms and extensive corruption. 

If North Korea's gambit is predicated on maintaining strict social control, it is not likely to succeed in the medium and long-term without radical changes.

What should be the course of future engagement policy with North Korea? 

Part of the answer must be found in acknowledging the legitimate security interests of all of the countries that have major stakes in the future of the Korean Peninsula and defining the common ground and points of conflict.

Another part is finding an acceptable formula to help North Korea address its internal governance challenges in ways that are compatible with a future of more open and constructive relations with the outside world.

This will require a different order of statesmanship than has been forthcoming in the past, and a determination to truly end the Korean War (1950-53) by seeking to build a new context for relations that better serves the present realities and future stability in the region. 

Reunification is not a realistic aspiration at present, but a new security framework that maintains stability and promotes deeper regional economic integration for mutual benefit seems to be a goal worth seeking.

The author is chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the US-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a member of the Executive Committee of the National Committee on North Korea. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn