US President Barack Obama's recent speech regarding the likely US policy changes in combating terrorism has been alternately praised and condemned, but it makes a vital foreign policy point, that the continued reliance on the post 9/11 strategy regarding terrorist groups is neither sustainable nor wise.

In his policy speech on the future of US counterterrorism efforts, the president made the following point: "Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless 'global war on terror,' but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America."

The simple fact is that the war the US launched after the 9/11 attacks has largely succeeded. The leadership of Al Qaeda that existed before 9/11 is dead or hiding, and the secure bases the organization enjoyed have largely been eliminated. In fact, many groups that identify themselves as "Al Qaeda" are in truth independent groups simply trying to lay claim to Al Qaeda's reputation.

Because of this, the president is correct in stating that the US must adapt to the changing situation. The "War on Terror" that has so defined the US for the last decade was initially aimed at large, centrally controlled organizations. Those organizations have largely been defeated, but they have been replaced by a more diffuse threat.

This new threat, which is comprised of loosely organized groups and individuals alike, cannot be effectively countered by a strategy that assumes future terrorist attacks will come from some centrally directed source.

Because of this, the US and its allies will have to focus on thwarting attacks by smaller, less organized groups, as well as on lone wolf style terrorists such as the Boston Marathon bombers.

Only by adopting flexible policies that can quickly respond to this more amorphous threat can the US maintain the safety of its citizens.

The president's acknowledgement that some tactics used in the war on terror have increased hostility toward the US helps further demonstrate the need to adopt US counterterrorism strategy to the new situation.

In a world where social media can allow a single individual to spread his or her message to millions, the US must be very cautious about actions that may give rise to popular anger and the consequent support for terrorist groups. 

Furthermore, not all terrorist groups are primarily focused on the US. It is true that the Benghazi attacks were focused on Americans, but there is evidence that these groups are more interested in securing their regional power, rather than striking the domestic US.

Other groups may be primarily interested in local ethnic or political conflicts, instead of a worldwide ideological battle.

In this case, the US must carefully consider whether or not its interests are best suited by intervening in what may be a primarily internal conflict. The attempt in some quarters to tie all terrorist or extremist groups into a single narrative is reminiscent of the long discredited domino theory that controlled US foreign policy for so many years during the Cold War.

Finally, although the "War on Terror" may have been successful in terms of largely dismantling Al Qaeda, it is important to measure the cost.

The US and its allies invaded two nations, sparking an open-ended military commitment that shows no sign of ending. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, US troops will remain in an advisory and support capacity long after combat deployments have ended.

The president has helped to establish the ground assumptions that will help the US continue to protect its own citizens while avoiding the use of unpopular and counterproductive tactics.

While the war on terror, in the sense of working to frustrate groups and individuals who seek to use terrorist tactics, may never cease, we can only hope that the president's speech marks the end of the "War on Terror."

The author is a freelance writer based in Corona, California. charlesgray109@gmail.com