Bruce Jones

Editor's Note:

Confronted by the rise of China, the impact of the global financial crisis, and the aftermath of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US confidence seems to be at a low ebb. Does the US still want to be a global leader? Is China a rival of the US? Global Times (GT) special correspondent in the US Zhai Xiang talked to Bruce Jones (Jones), senior fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institute, on these issues.

GT: On May 28, US President Barack Obama, in his commencement address at the US Military Academy at West Point, said that the US will lead the world for the next 100 years. How do you evaluate this remark?

Jones: The president was speaking to a domestic audience, and seeking to rebuff some of the more strident claims about US decline and retrenchment. The timeline may be exaggerated. But what's clear is that the US actually retains a leadership capacity and, with wise policy, is best placed to sustain leadership for the next two or three decades; perhaps beyond.

GT: In June, you were on a week-long trip in China. What is your latest impression of the country?

Jones: I was struck by how realistic the Chinese leadership and business community was about the still large gap between Chinese power and US power. That's obviously true in the military sphere, but they were very clear that it's also true in the economic sphere.

The absolute size of the economy is one thing; influence is another. The Chinese leadership and business community seems very aware that there's still a huge gap between the influence of the US economy and that of China.

I found most people in China particularly conscious of the per capita gap. They recognized that the US is the only large country with a high per capita GDP, and occupies a very influential role as a result.

That, and the huge technological gap, seem to be the main preoccupations of the leadership. The consequence of this is a need for continued deep economic cooperation if China is going to succeed in the next phase of growth.

GT: The sixth meeting of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held in early July. How do you see its results?

Jones: I believe the increased exchanges are important in keeping things on track. China's rise within Asia is bound to be destabilizing, no matter what policy China pursues, and some of its policies are seen as adding to instability.

But there are also important areas of cooperation, in the economic sphere in particular and on global issues like climate change and counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.

China is simply too big to rise without causing some concern from its neighbors about its intentions. Major powers create distrust simply by being powerful.

This was the wisdom of US leadership after WWII, to recognize this, and to establish a system whereby US growth could facilitate other countries' growth, and vice versa, plus the alliance system.

Even then, the US has had to live with Latin American suspicions about its intentions since the days of the Monroe Doctrine.

But China's policy does matter since it can ease or amplify these concerns by its actions.

The US sees a profound risk to stability from China-Japan clashes in the East China Sea, and it sees signs of a more aggressive China in its behavior in the South China Sea. My own view is that the East China Sea is more important and more difficult than the South China Sea, but there are risks in both.

There is a very strong consensus in the US that we should continue to play a strong role in deterring inter-state war in Asia, and that means responding to perceived intimidation or semi-aggressive moves by any party.

GT: The recent neighborhood disputes may have created some unfriendly feelings between China and the US. Is there any effective measure that either Beijing or Washington could take to improve this?

Jones: This issue has the potential to unravel much of the good potential in relations between the US and China.

Here's the irony. Both sides insist on freedom of navigation or passage. Both sides rely on the economic trade that flows through these waters. In what scenario short of war, a scenario both sides want to avoid, does either side have any interest in closing off the freedom to move through these waters? None.

So while there are important security issues here and differences of view, the most fundamental issue, the ability to keep these waters open for commerce and the flow of energy, is one that we actually share.

The reality is this: China is going to build enough capacity to make sure that the US cannot choke off these waters. Here's another reality: The US isn't going to leave the region - the stakes are too high.

So both sides are going to have to get used to the reality of the presence of the other.

I call it "mutually assured denial," a stable situation that we can both live with, and develop rules to ensure no accidents, unintentional clashes, and so on.

And as mentioned before, we also have to pay attention to other regions where we are cooperating, and expand that cooperation.

There are shared interests and opportunities for collaboration in Afghanistan, in parts of the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, in the development of stable agriculture and resource flows in Africa, and in many other areas.

We have to build up the story line of cooperation, to limit the fallout from any tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, but we also have to find a stable accommodation in those seas.