The decision by US President Barack Obama to deploy air strikes, however limited, against the Islamic State (IS), along with his decision to expedite arms and equipment to both the Iraqi central government and directly to the Kurds, marks a strategic change not only in Iraq but in the region, and possibly in Obama's entire foreign policy.

This important decision is based, first, on the military successes of the IS, particularly near Erbil, the Kurdish regional government capital, where many US diplomatic personnel and US military advisors were located.

But the overall military success of the IS since taking Iraq's second city, Mosul, in June, was a profound shock to the US administration.

The fear is that, if not stopped, the IS will succeed where Osama bin Laden failed, and establish a radical Islamic terror state.

This would destabilize the entire Middle East, place at risk the region's vital flow of oil to the rest of the world, and unleash an even more threatening wave of global terror.

Very rapidly international institutions, from the UN Security Council to the EU, acknowledged the same threat, and promised support to Iraq and particularly the Kurds. Nonetheless, Obama knew that only military force could stop IS, and only the US was able to commit that force.

Obama was elected to get the US out of wars in the Middle East, not start new ones, so taking this decision to commit force was really difficult for him.

Furthermore, he knew that part of the IS' success was due to the alienation of Iraq's Sunni Arab population by the sectarian policies of former Iraqi leader Nouri al-Maliki and other members of Iraq's majority Shia population. Thus any counteroffensive against the IS would have to have a political as well as military angle.

Obama's strategy to launch this counteroffensive has three core elements.

First, counterterrorism, and specifically augmenting the US' campaign against Al Qaeda to focus more on the Islamic State.

Second, US military actions to strike IS when its military crosses US "red lines," which so far have been limited, officially, to specific humanitarian catastrophes or endangered US personnel, or possibly key infrastructure.

Third, the broader campaign to provide limited military and intelligence support both to a more inclusive Iraqi government that can undermine IS' appeal to Sunni Arabs and to the moderate Syrian resistance.

The success rescuing people pursued by the IS from Sinjar mountain, the airstrikes which have allowed the Kurds to go on the offensive against the IS, the nomination of Haider al-Abadi, a moderate Shiite politician, as prime minister-designate, and Maliki's resignation, are all important steps forward. 

But to succeed in destroying the IS and its caliphate, the US will have to do much more, for much longer. And the entire international community must not only support, but participate in, the struggle to win the Middle East back.

The author is a Philip Solondz distinguished visiting fellow at The Washington Institute. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn