Editor's Note:

There have been discussions and debates about possible consequences of Chinese naval power growth. Will this lead to fundamental changes in Asian maritime dynamics? And how will the US accommodate China's maritime interests? Global Times (GT) reporter Chen Chenchen talked to Toshi Yoshihara (Yoshihara), John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at US Naval War College and co-author of Red Star Over the Pacific, on these issues.

Toshi Yoshihara Photo: Li Hao/GT

GT: There seems a consensus among Chinese scholars, both moderates and hard-liners, that China's military strength is still weak. How would you assess China's military power today?

Yoshihara: It depends on how you look at it. Compared to 20 years ago, there is no question that the Chinese military has improved by leaps and bounds in terms of the capabilities and the quality of the forces that have been deployed.

On the naval side, the regional balance of power in Asia is certainly shifting in favor of China. This is simply because of sheer mass, the number of ships and platforms that China has been able to deploy over the past decade. Given that China has engaged in serial production of some very capable platforms, I predict that the Chinese navy will in fact outsize Japan in certain ship types, probably by the end of this decade. So I wouldn't consider China to be very weak.

If you compare it to the US, China certainly has a long way to go to close the capabilities gap. However, I would still argue that China's catching up rapidly. Over the past two decades, the West has persistently underestimated China's military modernization.

Despite the consensus that the US is far ahead of China on many measures of military power, there's a fundamental asymmetry that still favors China in the regional context. The US is a global power with global responsibilities. Its forces are necessarily dispersed around the world.

GT: How do you think the US will respond? Will it increase its military deployment in Asia, or will it keep being dragged in other regions like the Middle East?

Yoshihara: I think that's the challenge. Since the announcement of the "pivot" in 2011, the US has had a hard time pivoting in practice. It gets dragged back in the Middle East. In terms of naval power, there are more serious problems.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the US faced a budget crunch. Sequestration could return in 2016. There are also structural problems, such as the declining shipbuilding industry and the increasing per unit cost of ships that the US can build. All these factors produce enormous downward pressures on the overall size of the fleet.

By some estimates, if sequestration continues, the fleet will shrink to such an extent that by the end of the pivot, the actual size of the fleet in Asia will be the same size as when the pivot began in 2011.

There are some real challenges to the US pivot. I'm prepared to say clearly that the US pivot is a response to China's ongoing military growth.

GT: What's the fundamental doctrine of such US response in Asia? Can the US ultimately accept a joint leadership with China in this region, or can it only accept hegemony?

Yoshihara: That's the biggest question of all. As China grows more powerful, it's going to expand its own interests and prerogatives. Many of those interests are a natural outgrowth of China's rise as a great power. I'm not prepared to deny the legitimacy and the rightfulness of what China perceives to be their rightful interests and prerogatives.

The question is whether the US will accommodate those interests. To me, it depends. There are some interests that are probably negotiable, but some are not. The non-negotiable areas are most important for the US.

One example in the maritime domain is the dispute over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China believes that certain activities in China's EEZ should not occur. Scientific activities that may be used for military purposes are seen as a security challenge to China. It also objects to US close-in surveillance operations along China's coastline.

The US position is that these activities are critical for the US to remain forward deployed and to remain a major, if not dominant, military power in Asia. These activities provide the US with the means to underwrite the current regional order, which has made the prosperity, wealth, and stability of the Asia possible in the first place, and from which China has benefitted enormously.

This dispute is thus a matter of principle. You can have better military-to-military relations. But until these fundamental differences are resolved, this impasse will remain. Problems in Sino-US relations are symptoms of this much deeper strategic difference.

The key question is: Is it necessary for the US to be the dominant power in East Asia? That's the big question.

GT: Currently in Washington is there already a debate about the necessity?

Yoshihara: No. When President Barack Obama came into office, there were expectations of a new foreign policy approach. Yet, he has articulated a US foreign policy consensus of previous presidents stretching all the way back to Franklin D. Roosevelt and postwar presidents like Harry S. Truman. The consensus is that the US must remain a leading power to underwrite the global order.

Obama has declared that the US is an indispensable nation. This foreign policy tradition will remain in force unless something forces the US to alter this strategic consensus.

GT: Before the very fundamental problem is finally resolved, some smaller steps have to be taken. Take the reconnaissance issue. Many Chinese analysts complain that since the 2001 US-China collision on the South China Sea, there seems little progress in building a mechanism to avoid such a conflict. Is building such a mechanism possible?

Yoshihara: It is possible to figure out the rules of engagement that will reduce the likelihood that tactical encounters at sea and in the air would lead to accidents and miscalculations. But such rules of the road will not resolve differences over what each side believes are matters of principle.

My interpretation of the Chinese view is this: The cessation of close-in surveillance is a precondition to a more normal relationship with the US. For the US, by contrast, the close-in surveillance helps the US better understand China's military capabilities and intentions. That better understanding is the basis for a more normal great power relationship with China. These are basic differences in worldviews and principles. I don't foresee these differing views changing any time soon.

What has changed is that China's military capabilities have improved. Those capabilities are now matching up with those long-standing policy aims. So these two different views over matters of principle are now beginning to rub up against each other more frequently.

We need to figure out how to manage the physical encounters of our military assets, which will be more frequent as China becomes more capable and as the US continues its pivot.