Joseph Nye

Editor's Note:

Harvard University professor Joseph Nye (Nye) coined the term "soft power" more than two decades ago. Efforts of soft power building have been consolidated by China in recent years. What challenges does China face in building its soft power? And with regard to China's unique path, can the emerging nation offer a genuine alternative to US model? Global Times (GT) reporter Wu Ningning invited Nye, who is also a former chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and senior Pentagon official, to discuss these issues.

GT: You once said China has had a limited return on its investment in soft power, so what are the limits of strengthening China's soft power?

Nye: A lot of soft power from other countries arises not from government actions but from civil society, so it often directly contacts with people that create soft power.

China has not allowed civil society to have as much independence as in the West. I think that limits China's soft power.

I also think the nationalism limits China's soft power. You can create a Confucius Institute in Hanoi, and then try to develop an appreciation for Chinese culture, but then the oil rig incident takes place and anti-Chinese feeling rises.

I'm not taking a position whether China was right or wrong, or on who owns this oil and this area, but it does mean that it's very hard to develop soft power when you have nationalism in other countries and also nationalism in China.

GT: What kind of Chinese values could be promoted abroad? Is it possible that China can explore another alternative to Western values?

Nye: People understand Chinese language, culture which goes from paintings to philosophy, so if people can develop an appreciation of China which makes China a more attractive country, which makes it look less-threatening and friendly, these are things that will help China.

You don't have to convert somebody from Christianity to Confucianism, you have to leave them with feeling China has a rich and interesting culture that makes people see China is a friendlier and less threatening country. That helps China in its foreign policy.

In factual terms, I do think China could increase its soft power if it allows more soft criticism and more different views to be heard and expressed; I think that would attract more people.

GT: How can hard power and soft power be combined?

Nye: There's the important point which is soft power alone doesn't solve problems, you have to have a way to combine the soft power with hard power into smart power strategies.

And when then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee Hu Jintao said at the 17th CPC National Congress in 2007 that China needs to invest more in soft power, that was a smart power strategy, as China's hard power is increasing, in economic growth and military growth.

When a country's hard power grows, it's likely to frighten its neighbors, and they form coalitions against it.

However, if a country can increase its soft power at the same time, then it seems friendlier and more attractive, and other countries are less likely to create coalitions against it. So Hu's speech in 2007 was actually a smart power strategy.

China would be wise to agree to an ASEAN multilateral code of conduct. China resists it because it wants to deal country by country, but the little countries still fear China because of its size.

If China shows there is a friendly willingness to have this code of conduct, that might help China's soft power, and China will still always be the biggest power in the region just by its size.

GT: Two decades ago we never thought China and Japan would engage in conflicts, but five or six years ago things began to get serious. And in 2012 we began to seriously think about how to avoid military conflict. How can we manage Sino-Japanese competition? How will the US position itself?

Nye: The US position has been that the best framework for East Asia is what I call triangular good relations, good relations between the US and China, between the US and Japan, and between China and Japan.

If that's the situation, then you will focus on economic growth and benefits. And there is still very heavy trade in that triangle from all three legs, which is good for everybody.

In such circumstances, the danger is if we allow conflicts, we all suffer, even if it doesn't break into a war, which would be a disaster.

My own view is that the best answer to these disputes is the one that former Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping suggested, which is to put it off to future generations. Don't try to solve the sovereignty issue now. It's just going to spoil the relationship.

We will agree to disagree, and put this off to another generation. I think that's probably the right way to deal with these issues.

We are not wise enough in this generation to solve it, but we will leave it for the wisdom of another generation. In the meantime, we will treat these islands as marine ecological preserve, with no habitation, and no military use. Then we each agree and disagree who has the sovereignty.

GT: Can the Chinese model offer an alternative to Western liberal democracy?

Nye: I don't see that. There are some people who think that there is an ideological competition like the Cold War. I don't think so.

I think if you look at the "Beijing model" of combining tight Party control with market mechanisms, I don't know how many other countries can do that.

Even if you look at some African countries which have authoritarian governments, they don't have the same capacity to develop the economy that China does.

So I don't see the China model sweeping the world in the way the Soviet Union used to think that their version of communism would sweep the world.

China has its own evolution; I don't know what future China will have politically.

But if you mean will the world look like the US, then no. But what is true is that as countries reach per capita income of $10,000, there is an increased demand for participation.

What does that participation look like? Does it look like what we call liberal democracy or something else? I don't know.

However, I think if I were a Chinese political leader, now that I'm reaching $10,000 per capita income measured in purchasing power parity, I would be thinking about how I am going to deal with this demand for participation.

GT: How can China and the US put aside their differences to build trust?

Nye: In some ways, I don't think our disagreements are fundamental literally. If you look at the cold war, I think you could say the US and Soviet Union had fundamental disagreements, and I don't think the US sees China as a threat to our existence, and I think the US is not a threat to China's existence.

The US doesn't talk about regime change in China, and it doesn't encourage Taiwan or Tibet breaking away from China. So I don't think the differences really are fundamental as you suggested, and certainly not as fundamental as between the US and Soviet Union during the cold war.

GT: Do you agree with Fukuyama's new argument of political decay? Is strong government necessary given the current American politics?

Nye: I think Fukuyama exaggerated the decay of American institutions. In fact American institutions are able to accomplish things. American institutions always had the degree of distrust government, that's the way the country was founded in the 18th century.

American government was always based on checks and balances that emphasized liberty over efficiency. That was the design of the founding fathers, and we are seeing it today.

When people say it's totally blocked nothing can happen, but you know in 2009 and 2010, the congress that had a major economic stimulus, the passed health care, the change of policy on the homosexuals in the military, these are big changes and so if the country is so blocked why you could make these changes? I think they do better than Fukuyama said.

GT: In your recent article, you state "gridlock in the national capital is often accompanied by political cooperation and innovation at the state and municipal levels." Could you elaborate the argument?

Nye: The federal system allows experimentation and change at the state and local level. That is not new. A century ago, Justice Brandeis called the states the "laboratories of democracy."