Ambiguity risky in Sino-US power games

Source:Global Times Published: 2014-12-15 20:18:01

Bonnie Glaser Photo: Chen Chenchen/GT



Editor's Note:

A substantial contingent of Chinese observers believe the US still pursues hegemony and is unlikely to share power in Asia with China. In Washington, is there a red line drawn against China in the Asia-Pacific region? How does the US see China's future role? Global Times (GT) reporter Chen Chenchen talked to Bonnie Glaser (Glaser), senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, over these issues.

GT: In your perspective, has Washington already given up on the zero-sum mentality in the Asia-Pacific region?

Glaser:
It's interesting you said that, because there is a very widely shared view in Washington that it is China that has a zero-sum mentality, not the US. The US has tried under the Obama administration to build some cooperation with China in the Asia-Pacific region to demonstrate to our respective publics and elites as well as to other countries that we can work together.

If you look at the fact sheets from the last round of the US-China Asia-Pacific Consultations, you'll see they agreed to set up a joint project, perhaps in the field of health, in Myanmar. It's still not implemented though.

China has good networks there and infrastructure. It has worked in the country for a long time. The US has relatively recently been developing its relationship with Myanmar. Why can we not put together our expertise and strength and help the people in Myanmar? It seems to be a no-brainer. But it's just really hard to implement in practice.

It's not fair to say that the US has a zero-sum mentality. In fact in talking to US officials, I think they have come to understand very clearly in the Obama administration, and I would say that they came to this realization very early on, not recently, that every nation in the region wants good ties with both China and the US, and no country wants to choose. The smaller Southeast Asian countries do sometimes feel caught in the middle. South Korea feels that way too. 

GT: So what should the US do with its rebalancing to Asia policy?

Glaser:
The president is committed to the rebalance to Asia, and he would like to follow through and to do more. But ultimately, in the absence of an economic success story as part of the rebalance, it will not be seen as a success. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is really becoming a litmus test of whether the rebalance to Asia will succeed or fail. If the rebalance is mostly military and to some extent diplomatic, the region will not see it as a success. For states in this region, economics and security are just too closely interconnected. They want very much to see more economic involvement of the US.

     Obama perceives himself the Asia-Pacific president. He wants to be remembered as having increased the emphasis on Asia in US foreign policy. I think that will become part of his legacy.

GT: Asia still lacks a security cooperation mechanism. Will there be one jointly led by the US and China?

Glaser:
I don't think countries in this region want the US and China to lead together. This fear is everywhere. Even though the whole G2 concept was never uttered by a single US official, it was portrayed as a US idea.

The fear is understandable. It's really hard to envision a single security institution in this region.

There've been talks about ASEAN regional forum, ASEAN plus one, ASEAN plus three, we have the ADMM, the ADMM plus, the East Asia Summit and so on.

Probably for many years to come, there will be many different institutions in this region, including the US bilateral alliances, which also contribute positively to regional security.

The US is now all-in. It wants to be very much an active participant in institution building in Asia. There will be reluctance on the part of the US and probably on the part of China too to try to run this region jointly. That would alienate everybody.

GT: In Washington, is there such thing as a red line that if crossed by China, would prompt military force in response from the US?

Glaser:
This is scenario-dependent. If China used military force against Taiwan, the US would probably respond. Both sides are very careful not to introduce military assets in the South China Sea. As an expert, one could come up with some hypothetical circumstances, but it's very difficult to come up with a scenario in which force would be used by either side against the other.

It's a little easier to imagine this possibility in the East China Sea. The US commitment under Article 5 of the US-Japan security treaty is quite clear. Obviously, Obama himself has spoken out on this issue, in part because the US wants to avoid miscalculation. The best thing is that there's clarity, and China knows where the US stands.

The US has been less clear in terms of its relationship with the Philippines. The US treaty with Manila is different to the treaty with Japan and predates the Philippines' assertion of its territorial claims in the Spratly Islands (known as the Nansha Islands in China). So it's a very different situation than exists in the East China Sea. That doesn't mean the US would not come to the Philippines' aid. We haven't said anything on that score.

Sometimes ambiguity is good, and sometimes it doesn't serve your interests. It's clear that the US wants to have a bit more ambiguity in the South China Sea, to give all parties more room to maneuver.

But the US doesn't want other nations to believe that somehow the US would be there to defend them if they use force or engage in some kind of provocative action.

GT: Will the US share power with China, or will it only accept hegemony?

Glaser:
It's a hotly debated topic. When I discuss this with US officials, they argue that the US, not only in the Asia-Pacific region but globally, has already accommodated China. One example that people give is the encouragement the US gave to China to join the WTO. The US certainly knew at the time it was going to boost economic growth in China.

I think the US is open to some readjustment of the international system. The question is where and to what extent.

It is not true that the US opposes any adjustment to the system, and it's not true that the US wants to keep China weak and prevent China's rise.

But there are areas in which the US is reluctant to promote China's inclusion, because it fears that China wants to change the rules that the US thinks have worked well and continue to work well. In areas where there are no rules, for example cyber security and outer space, several countries can sit down and create new rules and regulations to guide behavior.



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