Narendra Modi has just completed his first year as India's prime minister.

With only a vague foreign policy platform one year ago, it now becomes clearer that Modi has largely inherited his two predecessors' foreign policy legacies and no dramatic reform has so far been seen.

This is especially evident in his handling of major power politics. He tries to seek better relations with the US and Japan in general, and strike an optimal trade-off between guarding against China's increasing influence and expanding the economic cooperation.

But the result is that some elements that used to drag Indians' ambitions on the international stage are still in place. For example, India's China policy during Modi's first year is still heavily security-driven.

Other policy goals tend to be sidelined when security concerns are involved, or worse, allegedly involved. This is what can be observed when Modi's foreign economic initiatives to work with China are jeopardized by security concerns, especially those from the security institutions and domestic hawks.

In a successful piece of public diplomacy, Modi announced during his recent visit to China that e-visa facilities will be extended to Chinese nationals, a hard-won compromise after bargaining with security and intelligence wings over their security concerns.

But what gets in the way of bilateral exchanges are the conference, business and working visas, a situation that this announcement does nothing to improve because e-visas cover only tourists.

Overt security concerns will drive the government to choose suboptimal choices. This is found in the Indian mind-set that links its security concerns, such as border disputes and China's Pakistan policy, with its own policies on China wherever security factors can be involved.

Thus there is a vicious circle preventing the improvement of bilateral relations: When China proposes expanding cooperation, India stresses there is no trust; China proposes to establish and enhance trust, while India mentions China's relations with Pakistan; China hails mutual understanding, and India wants unilateral compromise on border disputes; when China wants to negotiate on border issues, India says there is no trust to base a solution on.

China's memory of such linkage policies dates back to Bill Clinton's first term as US president. In 1993, he linked China's most-favored-nation status with human rights. Facing increasing domestic and international opposition, he eventually ordered a de-linkage by endorsing the idea that it was in the best interests of the US to promote trade with China.

At that time, the US could choose its position and China was looking for US investment and technology. Now while India is seeking Chinese investment and manufacturing technology, it still links such cooperation with security issues. There is no logical reason behind the practice.

Unlike India, China adopts an economy-oriented policy, which means that for a better economic cooperation it is willing to shelf the disputes for larger mutual interests.

Currently, an important international economic initiative by China is to drive regional and international connectivity through the Silk Road economic belt and 21st century maritime Silk Road.

Nonetheless, we find a strong suspicion among Indians that China actually aims at penetrating the Indian sphere of influence, which in turn makes Modi and his government hesitate to respond or, even worse, to decide to counter Chinese initiative.

China believes that cooperation can be reached despite a deficit of trust and in turn trust will be improved with a cooperative relationship.

The author is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, and currently a visiting scholar at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn