Jürgen Kocka

Editor's Note:

In the past half century, Germany has deeply probed into the darkest parts of its history. Conversely, many of its neighbors believe Japan has failed to face up to its wartime past. Why can Germany talk about the holocaust so honestly and fully? What should Japan learn from Germany's dealing with its past? Can the methods by which Franco-German reconciliation was reached be adopted in Sino-Japanese relation? Global Times (GT) reporter Wu Ningning talked with German historian Jürgen Kocka (Kocka), former president of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, on these issues as the 70th anniversary day of the end of the WWII approaches.

GT: Why could Germany deal with its history of genocidal mass murder so properly?

Kocka: In Germany, it took some time before a relatively open memory of the past was reached. In the 1950s, there were lots of taboos, and people used to like to speak of other topics, not about their involvement with the Nazis, so it was a step-by-step process, in which during the 1960s the movement of young, critical students played a major role, until in 1985 former president Richard von Weizsäcker said in his famous speech on the 40th anniversary of the end of the war that "the 8th of May was a day of liberation. It liberated all of us from the inhumanity and tyranny of the [Nazi] regime."

I also want to stress the role of the victorious powers who occupied defeated Germany. They had discovered and liberated the camps where all these unbelievable massacres took place. They had documented what they saw. As occupation powers, they used these films and other documents for propaganda and education. So the crimes were made visible and public. This started the process of reeducation.

The churches, particularly the Protestant ones, and intellectuals, played a role. Germany had long had a tradition of intensive public debate, now including debates about national mistakes and weakness. Public opinion was developed strongly, and in this context public criticism, including self-criticism, was increasingly accepted.

You must see that the defeat was also very thorough in 1945. In contrast with WWI, when there was no occupation of defeated Germany and many Germany failed to accept their country's defeat, after WWII foreign troops conquered Berlin, bombs had destroyed the cities, and it was evident to many that Germany had really and justly lost. This is one of the most important points; it was clear that Germany had lost and that it had done something terrible.

A relatively honest collective memory forms the identity of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the former West Germany. We kept the memory of this evil part of history in order to set us apart from it, and to build something new. So a positive identification of the new FRG was shaped through an open collective memory. It also helped Germany find it easier to be accepted internationally within Europe and the Western world.

GT: Compared with Germany, Japanese wartime reflection is often seen as insincere. So what can Japan learn from Germany's attitude?

Kocka: I am very cautious in teaching Japanese anything. I do not know enough of Japan. Every country must find its own way of doing this. But I want to say: It is not a sacrifice, to be honest. If you accept your past crimes by saying now we are forming a better country than we used to be, you can develop national pride and self-acceptance.

It was important that then German chancellor Konrad Adenauer accepted the responsibility of the German government and compensated Israel since the 1950s. This attitude also affected German foreign policy, and Germany found it easier to gain acceptance by the Western alliance after WWII.

It can be a national advantage if you publically accept the responsibility for defeat and national guilt. If you do it in the right way, you can use it for building your own strong national identity and credibility.

GT: Could you elaborate how a "German national identity" was instilled in the Germany after WWII?

Kocka: Let me talk from my own experience. I was born in 1941, right in the war, and I didn't identify much with the FRG at first, since I moved from East Germany and had lived in Austria.

It was only from 1954 onward that I went to school in a West German city. I slowly developed identification with the FRG. Why? Because I really thought that we were developing a new Germany which was better than anything we ever had in German history. For this kind of identification building, awareness of the dark periods of German history was indispensable.

As a historian, I am glad if somebody can learn from history. But learning from history is not an easy process. There were a lot of controversies among Germans in the 1950s-1970s, and even today. Anyway, it has produced a better Germany. The memory of the past, including its dark side, is part of the German identity.

GT: What role can historians play?

Kocka: History has been a very important profession in Germany since the foundation of the state in the 19th century. Historians had always played an important role in the public self-consciousness of Germany.

After 1945, special institutes were founded, such as the famous Institute of Contemporary History, in Munich, in order to concentrate research on the Nazi period. And this was done partly because within the universities historians were reluctant to touch upon this. And then historians gradually assumed a public role in Germany: they sometimes spoke in the parliament, at major days of commemoration, and they were frequently interviewed by the media.

It's certainly not only the political duty of citizens but also the professional obligation of historians to say the truth, even if it is unpleasant.

GT: Is it possible for China and Japan to follow the path of Franco-German reconciliation?

Kocka: I think the reasons for Franco-German rapprochement have many aspects, but one major factor was the Cold War. After WWII, there was still a lot of hostility between the French and the Germans, and the French hoped to keep defeated Germany down. The change came in the late 1940s when the Americans identified the Soviet Union as their main threat, and tried to unite Western Europe on their side. This threat by the Soviet Union was not only perceived by the Americans but also by the non-Communist forces and groups in Western Europe. But I don't see any comparative common threat for China and Japan nowadays.

The other reason is their very similar culture. I mean they have a lot of common traditions and philosophies, a common heritage in which 18th century Enlightenment, and 19th century nation building play a major role.

Most importantly, both in Germany and in France, a sober and honest awareness of what went wrong in the past became central for reconciliation in the present. Many of us saw the catastrophic consequences of French-German hostility. And we asked: was it worth it? And the answer was: no. Do such convictions and feelings exist in China and Japan today?