Soviet interests drew China into Korean War

• Source: Global Times
• [21:40 June 17 2010]
• Comments

GT: How did China enter into the war?

Shen: After the US landed in Inchon on September 15, 1950, North Korea's situation became increasingly desperate. Kim asked Stalin immediately if North Korea should ask for China's aid. But Stalin replied on September 24 that North Korea should preserve and depend on itself. China also signaled to the Soviet Union that the situation in the Korean Peninsula was critical that China and the Soviet Union should send military aid there, but Stalin didn't respond to China's request.

On September 30, Moscow received a report from its ambassador to North Korea, Terenty Shtykov, that Seoul was probably already lost and the road for the main force of the North Korea's People's Army to retreat had been cut and communication had been cut off.

That same night, Kim sent a letter seeking help, earnestly requesting that Stalin provide "direct military assistance," and if that was not workable, to please "help form international volunteer armies in China and other people's democratic countries." Facing this emergency, Stalin finally gave the green light to the Chinese armies.

GT: The Soviets and China once thought of giving up North Korea. Why?

Shen: On October 1, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao, asking Chinese troops to enter Korea for the war as volunteers, organizing defenses in the areas north of the 38th Parallel. Stalin also rather disingenuously stated "I have not mentioned this to the Korean comrades and do not intend to mention it. But I have no doubt that they will be very happy after they hear this."

Due to vigorous advocacy by Mao and General Peng Dehuai, China finally adopted a resolution to send troops into battle in Korea. Soon afterward, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was formally established and the army en-tered the final prewar preparation stage.

On October 8, Mao informed Kim and Stalin that China had decided to form a volunteer army to assist North Korea, and the troops would start entering Korea around October 15.

However, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai went to the Soviet Union to confirm the weapons, equipment and air support it promised to provide, Stalin pointed out that he could still completely meet all China's needs for military equipment like airplanes, tanks and artillery, but the Soviet air force was not yet ready and could not go into action for two to two-and-a-half months.

After extended discussions, both sides agreed that since both could only be ready after six months when North Korea would have been occupied by South Korea and the US, they had to give up the country and inform Kim to arrange a retreat as soon as possible.

Stalin required Mao to make the final decision, so that China would have been blamed if North Korea had been lost in the end.

But actually, the Soviet Union's military force was already prepared for war.

Stalin always forbade Soviet forces from directly engaging with US forces at the frontline, even when they pro-vided air cover in the rear areas. He was skeptical about the determination of the Chinese to intervene and the prospects for victory even if they did.

Finally, Stalin still had hopes of solving the Korean issue peacefully through secret diplomatic channels. But the secret diplomacy failed.

Mao first agreed, but later changed his mind and insisted on sending troops to Korea, as this action carries greater significance politically rather than militarily. He believed that if the US occupied the whole of Korea, China's security would be endangered.

When China engaged with US troops in Korea, Stalin finally trusted China and offered air force support.

The result was that the war enhanced Sino-Soviet relations and formed a real alliance between the two countries.