Illustration: Sun Ying

Recently it took Mother Nature's intervention, in the form of a tropical storm, to calm the turbulent waters around Huangyan Island. Unfortunately, the inclement weather may prove only to be the eye of a gathering political storm between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, with the US, Manila's treaty partner, potentially drawn in.

A more destabilizing phase could unfold in the weeks ahead, even as ASEAN works to craft a draft code of conduct supposed to bind China and the contending Southeast Asian claimants into a peaceful modus vivendi.

Both sides appear committed to maintaining a physical presence in the area in order to demonstrate "effective control" over the disputed feature, a recipe ripe for continuing tensions.

There are indications that Vietnam-China tensions over the South China Sea may also be returning to the boil, threatening a mutual, high-level effort that has delivered a relative respite since October 2011.

On June 21, Vietnam announced that its National Assembly had passed an amended Law on Water Resources and the Law of the Sea.

The new law reaffirms Hanoi's claims to, as China calls them, the Nansha and Xisha islands, in full. The timing of the bill's passage, bundled in on the final day of the current legislative session, surprised many observers. Beijing was swift to protest the new law as "not conducive to peace and stability."

Yet on the same day China announced that it had upgraded the administrative status of its territorial claims in the South China Sea from county to prefectural-level. From a Southeast Asian perspective, this move was equally provocative.

While it is unclear which came first, a new action-reaction cycle has been ushered in. It would be highly unfortunate if this dynamic spreads to the military realm.

In mid-June, Vietnam's air force announced that it would mount regular air patrols over the Nansha Islands, including Su-27 interceptors. One can only imagine how a reciprocal announcement from China's air force would be greeted.

In April at the ASEAN summit in Cambodia, the Philippines asked ASEAN to take a lead in the South China Sea disputes, urging efforts to promote "a rules-based, multilateral and peaceful resolution of the issue." ASEAN, however, takes no official position on the sovereignty disputes themselves.

Moreover, ASEAN's ability to agree a draft code of conduct that is acceptable to its "frontline" claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines, is hobbled by two major constraints. First is the failure of ASEAN's active claimants, Malaysia included, to mutually recognize their overlapping claims in the Nansha Islands.

Besides, ASEAN's non-claimants have limited appetite for confronting China where their direct national interests are not demonstrably engaged.

Even if a draft can be put together, China needs to agree on the principle of dealing multilaterally with ASEAN, against Beijing's entrenched bilateral preferences, and on the substance of the proposed code.

This is unlikely given that Beijing has demonstrated scant enthusiasm for moving beyond the guidelines of implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, agreed last July in Bali.

If the Philippines has been disappointed by ASEAN's muted public solidarity, it is perhaps too much to expect from an organization that expressly eschews collective self-defense, in spite of a commitment to becoming a political and security "community" by 2015.

The best that Hanoi and Manila can probably expect from ASEAN is a common denominator position on peaceful resolution of disputes, and just possibly, a common interface among the ASEAN co-disputants in the future.

This should not preclude the flexibility to explore bilateral communication with China.

Vietnam, for example, enjoys unique access through its inter-governmental contacts, with the proven ability to tamp down tensions when the will is present. Where such channels are absent, as in the Philippines-China relationship, conflict prevention and crisis management are far more haphazard.

From a realist perspective, one might argue convincingly that a divided ASEAN, and a weakened code of conduct into the bargain, is to China's advantage in the South China Sea. The temptation to maximize one's bargaining position bilaterally is felt by all rising powers.

ASEAN's other long-standing common denominator, dating from its foundation, is the aim of minimizing of great power rivalries, and attendant exclusive loyalties, in the region.

Yet the corollary is that when ASEAN is undermined or overlooked, individual members will compensate through external alliances and alignments, a trend now visible in the region.

Compared with the stark alternatives of going it alone or confronting the US, embracing ASEAN as its principal interlocutor in the South China Sea may be China's lowest-cost option for an equitable modus vivendi.

The author is a senior fellow with S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn