In a recent interview with the Global Times, Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski (Brzezinski) noted a picture of himself at dinner with former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Brzezinski, a former national security advisor of the Carter administration, has been involved in the development of Sino-US relations since the 1960s. How does he see the new Chinese leadership which has just been sworn into office? What is the future of the relationship between the two giant powers? Global Times (GT) correspondents Wen Xian and Li Boya talked to Brzezinski on these issues.
GT: What do you see as the significance of the recently concluded "two sessions?" Can you tell us your personal impression of China's new leadership?
Brzezinski: I've met President Xi Jinping, and I have had the opportunity to have some lengthy discussions with him. He strikes me as thoughtful, insightful, clear-headed, confident, not boastful, and with good antennae for the international situation and for domestic developments in China.
I think he has a genuine opportunity to address, effectively I hope, some of the more serious structural and social dilemmas that China is beginning to confront because of its success.
And I want to repeat that. The dilemmas that China confronts are not the consequences of failure; they are the consequences of success. But sometimes the consequences of success can be very difficult and dangerous.
The significance is that I assume the Chinese leadership was thoughtfully and comprehensively discussing both domestic and international issues. Not all of these sessions were open, and not all of what they said was reported. But I have to assume that the amount of time that was given indicates that it was a very comprehensive review.
GT: What are the most serious challenges for China now?
Brzezinski: They are derived from success. Success has created a large scale urban middle class. It has created a whole new young generation of Chinese who are in touch with the world via computer. In addition, China has created circumstances in which millions travel abroad and hundreds of thousands study abroad.
In that context, excessive reliance on authority, censorship, privileged relationships which produce corruption, and secrecy about circumstances in which officials take advantage of their positions to gain special benefits and particularly wealth, are all things which are damaging to China's prospects and could produce social tensions and impatience.
All of that I know China's leaders understand and think about. It's very easy for me to talk about it sitting here in Washington. It's much more difficult to deal with when living in or governing a country with 1.3 billon people, so I understand the difficulties the Chinese leaders face.
But I think confronting these problems openly and discussing them openly is the best way to resolve them in a manner that will be satisfactory to China, in a manner that is the Chinese way of solving these problems.
Doing so will eliminate some of the tendency toward sterility, self-centeredness, and the abuse of privilege, not to mention some forms of censorship which prevent a constructive, nationwide social debate about domestic problems. The Chinese people are extremely sophisticated, and the new Chinese middle class is extraordinarily well-informed about the outside world. Hence an open debate about some of these issues would strengthen the government, would strengthen the country.
GT: What contributions can China make to the world?
Brzezinski: The question is how active China will be in dealing with the wide-ranging, and in some respects escalating, global problems. I believe that we are no longer threatened by the hegemonic wars which took place over the course of the last two hundred years.
Notably, because of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and particularly the Cold War, we today cannot even contemplate seriously any national policy designed to achieve global hegemony.
We in the US are proud of our system, and we hope others will emulate, in particular, some of our domestic democracy, but we are aware that we cannot impose the US system on the world in the way that Soviet leaders used to talk about the world essentially adopting the communist revolution.
I know that China, for example, is very proud of its achievements, but I do not see in Chinese statements or official policies any indication that China expects, or wants, the whole world to emulate the Chinese system.
I don't want to give lessons to the Chinese people. The Chinese people have their own experience, and they are led by intelligent leaders who know what is feasible and what is not. I would merely say that as a general proposition, a world which is increasingly turbulent and dominated by political, religious, and ethnic turmoil is a world that is not going to be congenial to China's national interests.
So I think that it is important for China to be as engaged as the US is in trying to deal with some of the global problems. And I am encouraged that China and the US are participants in the talks with Iran, I am encouraged that China is involved in trying to cope with the Syrian problem, but I wish that we were closer together on that issue.
There is the North Korea issue where we are responding together. And I think that is ultimately good.
The notion that China can develop successfully but in isolation from global problems is no longer feasible. China can develop successfully by joining others in coping with global problems. And that particularly means China and the US cooperating, because we are the two largest economic powers in the world.
Military power is more difficult to measure, but I certainly do not think that military power is measured only by atomic bombs, so one way or another China is one of the leading military powers even if the US is clearly the leading military power.
We have a lot of joint capacity for collaboration, not only in the Middle East, not only in the Far East, but perhaps in Africa, perhaps regarding central Asia. And I think it's important that we do collaborate because that will be of benefit to the world at large and it will consolidate and deepen the US-China relationship.
GT: Is conflict between China and the US inevitable?
Brzezinski: A stable cooperative partnership between the US and China is in the interests of both countries. But it is a relationship, which if it is a partnership, is one that requires nourishing cooperation, promoting it, sustaining it, and not thoughtlessly damaging it. There are tendencies to damage it both in China and in the US, and I think we should be prepared to confront those tendencies openly.
I am a little worried about the relationship right now. Because as you know there have been a lot of criticisms of China in the US. Even failed Republican candidate Mitt Romney said he would verbally attack China on the day of his inauguration.
Our press continuously criticizes our president, our government and our policies, and it is quite customary for our politicians to denounce our own leaders.
So we know that what is stated in that context by the US side, particular about China, has to be seen as what is official and what is just public discourse. And a lot of public discourse about China is not serious. It is just frustration or envy or ignorance or whatever. Our public statements, our official statements, are prudent and careful.
On the Chinese side, there are no newspaper articles about corrupt senior officials until the government criticizes those officials. There are no critical statements about the Chinese leaders. So what your press says about us is more official. And it is much more nationalistic. As a result, what worries me these days is what I see in the Chinese press.
These are semi-official statements. So your press is an official speaker and you are creating an atmosphere, and I'm speaking seriously now, you are creating an atmosphere in China in which you are stirring up a very powerful social force, which is nationalism. You can create, especially in the context of domestic difficulties, an atmosphere dominated by nationalism, which will make it impossible for you to cooperate with us. And it will make it impossible for us to cooperate with you.
We don't have that in the US. No one I know in the government talks badly about China. Among private people, yes, a lot of them talk about China badly, some businessmen, for example, who cannot compete with you. But others in the US say "oh, no, protect our access to China, have the Chinese come here." We have a diversity of views.
Your nationalism is also strong because at this stage of your history, you are acquiring a sense of success after a century and a half of bitter wars and domestic humiliation. So your nationalism tends to be dangerously strong, and if you're not careful, you will not only make your relationship with Japan more difficult - we are telling the Japanese all the time not to make the relationship with China more difficult, and I've done it personally - but you're making it more difficult to deal yourselves with the Japanese, and with us.
So I am concerned about the rise of nationalism in China, and your military are the most nationalistic. And don't make the mistake that other countries have made a century ago. You are not going to be a global hegemony; we are not going to be a global hegemony, because the world is too complicated. But by working together, we can be partners in gradually overcoming the pressures toward turmoil and chaos which are becoming stronger everywhere in the world. And this is where historical and strategic responsibility creates a unique opportunity for the US and China.
I think your leaders should think about what is being fomented, because statements like these are not going to influence Xi, since he is too intelligent for that, but they will influence a lot of people.
I'm still optimistic, but when I see, for example, the Chinese military newspaper suggesting that China should link up with North Korea and Russia against the US, I say to myself that if there was a US air force general or admiral saying that publicly, he probably would be fired.
GT: What's your advice for the new leaders of both countries?
Brzezinski: My advice is very simple. They have to meet often and talk to each other privately and with friendliness.
It's not good enough to stand in front of the White House or to stand in front of Tiananmen and for the two leaders to say we love each other. They have to be able to talk to each other seriously about problems, about the kinds of things that I mentioned to you very directly. Because I feel that as an old friend of China, because I've been always very frank and direct with your leaders, I have a right to say that.
I think we are moving into a phase in which your nationalism and our nationalism could become mutually adversarial. And that would be unfortunate.
GT: What do you think of the "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific?
Brzezinski: Well, first of all let me repeat, "pivot" is a journalistic term. President Barack Obama never used it. I know that from him, he never used that word. Some US officials used it, but the president didn't.
What was intended was simply a reaffirmation that with Asia becoming more important, and with us being a Pacific power, we have to be more present in Asia.
New US Secretary of State John Kerry has just went to Europe and the Middle East, because there are problems in both places.
I think you should be flattered that he did not go to you, because that means you're not on that list. Look where he went. Everywhere where he went there are problems. He went to Egypt. You want him to go to China for the same reason that he went to Egypt? No, because you are doing well, you're stable. But quite seriously, I think both Xi and Obama ought to re-read the January 2011 US- China Joint Statement, which is very ambitious and outlines exactly what is needed.
And second, they should have regular meetings. I think that right now there is no plan for Obama to go to China or to meet with Xi.
There ought to be informal regular meetings every year, informal but regular, because, look, even the very interconnectivity of these two economies is such that unless we work in a cooperative manner, collisions of a social economic type could be very disruptive for both of us. That I think is the key point.
Beyond that we obviously have serious problems to try to contain. I think a war with Iran would be a disaster, for Europe, for Asia, and eventually for the US. And we have to respond to that challenge jointly.
I think the Iranians have to realize that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a binding obligation. We have to realize that Iran as a historic nation, very proud, large, has a right to have a comprehensive nuclear program, but that everyone else has the right to be sure that it is not the point of departure for nuclear weapons. Look what happened in North Korea. They are becoming increasingly, to put it delicately, unpredictable.
That's not good for South Korea, it's not good for Japan, it's not good for China, and it's not good for us.
There are other problems; I think we should look at global problems as problems that are of importance to both China and the US, and that will be the beginning of a sense of shared global responsibility.
You're now at a stage at which your future development can no longer be pursued without considering its global effects, for better or for worse. That's the new reality. We have to get accustomed to the idea that the five decades of the US domination of the world, militarily, financially, has finished.
We are still the No.1 power and will still be for some decades to come, and then we will see what happens. But in the meantime, we have to work with others - and with you - very much so, but also Japan. US-Japanese ties are not meant against China, but are meant to maintain stability in the West Pacific.
And we want to strengthen Europe, because a stronger Europe will have more opportunity to be a constructive player on the world's scene. We need a stronger Europe on the world's scene. The fact is Europe is unable to cope with problems that affect Europe, so they come to us all the time for help.
We have to have a relationship with the Europeans which will create a greater capacity both to deal with these problems and on that basis to seriously negotiate with the Far East regarding trade arrangements and so forth.
I'm sorry that the Trans-Pacific Partnership idea, that we are propagating, doesn't include China. I think that is a mistake. But I also know there is a Chinese proposal, for an Asian cooperative sphere, which does not include us. We are both making mistakes.
GT: You once said that the real threat to a stable US-China relationship arises not from hostile intentions by the US or by China, but from the disturbing possibility that a revitalized Asia may slide into nationalistic fervor which then precipitates conflicts reminiscent of 20th century Europe. Do you still hold to this view?
Brzezinski: It's not my central point, but I think there is a serious danger that there could be a repetition in Asia in the 21st century of what happened in Europe in the 20th century: a combination of territorial and ethnic conflicts, of national ambitions, and sometimes of hegemonic aspirations.
You know the history of Asia better than I. Almost every relationship in Asia across the border is at least partially hostile. And that could break down.
This is why I think that an US presence in the West Pacific can be stabilizing and therefore good for Asia, and particularly good for China, because if any country in Asia is the object of increasing fear on the part of some, it is China.
Most people don't fear Indonesia, they don't fear the Indians, they don't fear the Japanese anymore. The Japanese are getting old, and they're in a very different psychological state of mind because of World War II.
People fear China. You could find yourself isolated. You're big enough to survive it, it wouldn't be terrible for you, but it would not be good either.
What I advocate for the US is not involvement in mainland conflicts or some sort of anti-Chinese alliance, but a presence a little bit like Great Britain in the 19th century versus Europe: no involvement on the mainland but careful balancing so that stability is maintained. And I think that's helpful to China.
I'm not going to offer a solution because I am not a utopian.
It is conceivable that these problems will not be handled well and that they'll get out of hand. But I think it is certainly possible for us to make a joint effort to prevent that from happening. And we first of all have to start with the intent of getting these problems under control.
We are not doing it right now sufficiently. Also there is this negative drift in the atmosphere of the US-Chinese relationship. That has to be overcome, since this can become the beginning of epidemics of hostility. And that we have to avoid.