Cai Fangbai (right) meeting French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Photo: Courtesy of Cai Fangbai

Editor's Note:

France is a key player in international relations. French leader Charles de Gaulle's doctrine that "France cannot be France without greatness" has been at the heart of French foreign policy for decades.

France was the first Western power to opt for diplomatic ties with the PRC at the ambassadorial level, and yet the growth of the Sino-French relationship ever since has not been entirely smooth.

The following is an interview by Global Times (GT) reporter Xu Yan with Cai Fangbai (Cai), former Chinese ambassador to France (1990-98) and to Switzerland (1987-90), on his inside perspective of France's foreign policies and the Sino- French relationship.

The 74-year-old former ambassador is also president of the China Society for French Affairs Studies, vice chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 9th National People's Congress, and a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

GT: You were on diplomatic missions to France for 24 years, and the ambassador to France between 1990 and 1998. Looking back upon those years, what was the most challenging part of your job?

Cai: Chairman Mao Zedong had a famous line of poetry, "On perilous peaks dwells beauty in her infinite variety." I like this line very much.

The toughest part of my diplomatic career came in the early 1990s when France sold six frigates to Taiwan in 1991, and 60 Mirage-2000 fighters in 1992. The Sino-French relationship fell to the lowest point since 1964.

Our clash with the French government over the issue was very complicated and tortuous. The arms sales to Taiwan went on in secret. We got information from French media about the final agreement on the sale of the fighters on November 8, 1992. As the French government knew it had done something wrong, it delayed clarifying the issue to China, hoping that the delay would make China unable to react strongly and promptly. Eventually France admitted the sale, while still trying to justify it. This was certainly unacceptable, and triggered a string of retaliatory measures from China.

It was at the worst times that I gained a better knowledge of China's foreign policy and how to combine firmness with flexibility. A few years later, Sino-French ties returned to normal and eventually reached new heights.

GT: The joint communiqué issued in 1964 was short, with two sentences and 44 Chinese characters. It was described by Western media as a political nuclear bomb. How do you see this groundbreaking diplomatic move after 46 years?

Cai: I went to Paris in April 1964 after three months of diplomatic probation in the Chinese embassy in Switzerland.

The joint communiqué of the Sino-French diplomatic relationship announced on January 27, 1964 had only two sentences: "The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China have jointly decided to establish diplomatic relations. To this effect, they have agreed to designate ambassadors within three months."

Despite being unprecedentedly brief, the ice-breaking joint communiqué was of strategic importance. It marked the first step that transcended the bipolar world to a multipolar one.

But the negotiation about diplomatic ties did not go smoothly at first. The chief negotiator of France, then Prime Minister Edgar Faure, insisted on two conditions. First, France could not take the initiative in breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Second, France needed to keep its low-ranking consuls in Taiwan. Neither condition was acceptable to China.

To break the impasse of the negotiation, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai arranged for Faure and his wife to travel to Inner Mongolia and the Yungang Grotto in Shanxi Province. That gave both sides time and space to think it over. Three days later when Faure came back to Beijing, a deal called "the three-point tacit agreement" was soon reached. Among the three points was one that recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China.

GT: You have been in close contact with six French presidents. It is often said that foreign policy is all about judgments made by key political figures. What is your impression?

Cai: Key political figures do play a vital role. This is particularly the case in France.

As translator to Huang Zhen, PRC's first ambassador to France, I met then French President Charles de Gaulle on different occasions in the 1960s.

De Gaulle was a colossus of 20th century world politics, with an impressively clear head and a strategic vision. "France cannot be France without greatness," as de Gaulle wrote in his memoir. Everything he did for France during his presidency was aimed to seek big-power influence on the world stage. He remains a source of inspiration to generations of French leaders.

As for other French presidents, Georges Pompidou was a former banker, and his pragmatism and diligence impressed me.

I remain in personal contact with Valery Giscard D'Estaing. Amid the downturn of the global oil crises in the 1970s, he acted as a leader capable of putting theory into practice. He chaired the convention that drafted the first EU constitution.

I submitted my credentials as China's ambassador to France to Francois Mitterrand on December 21, 1991. He reiterated the commitment that France would not intervene in China's internal affairs.

It was just diplomatic rhetoric, however. In reality, despite his efforts in pushing for the establishment of diplomatic ties before taking office as president, he took the lead in imposing sanctions against China after 1989.

Mitterrand was a strategist, and a utilitarian as well. He would do whatever that favored his own interests.

His approval of arms sales to Taiwan reflected his utilitarianism. He miscalculated the situation, assuming China would soon collapse as the Soviet Union had done. He was also counting on the decision to serve his own interests. Even now, the kickbacks scandal, in which some top French politicians were allegedly involved, stemming from the arms sales to Taiwan in the early 1990s, continues to unfold.

I was still the ambassador to France when Jacques Chirac became president in 1995. I was greatly impressed by his deep understanding of Chinese culture.

As the US unilateralism harmed the European interests, and China's promising prospects were evidenced, two giant strides were taken during his presidency. One was the all-round partnership built since 1997, and the other was the all-round strategic partnership established since 2004.

GT: Sino-French relations have been on a roller coaster ride since President Nicholas Sarkozy took office in 2007. Why?

Cai: I became acquainted with Sarkozy about three decades ago. He became a city councilor of Neuilly-sur-Seine at the age of 23, and later elected mayor. Our embassy building is located right there.

Sarkozy has some knowledge about China. I arranged his three visits to China before he was elected president.

The first trip was made in June 1991, and he was treated with appropriate respect. He was touched that even after losing his post he was treated the same way in another trip in 1995.

During his trip to China as the interior minister in 2004, he asked for a meeting with the Chinese president. He believed the meeting would boost his image and do him good in the 2007 presidential campaign. We arranged the meeting after careful deliberations. He was deeply moved.

His state visit to China in 2007 was a very successful one. The commitments he made were clear-cut: He would attend the opening ceremony of Olympic Games, and agreed that both Tibet and Taiwan were integral parts of the PRC.

Why was there an abrupt shift in Sarkozy's policy stance in 2008? Aiming at winning another term, he cared a lot about public opinion. The Olympic Games put booming China in the spotlight, raising the eyebrows of some Europeans. So he changed his tone, saying his decision to attend the opening ceremony would depend on the talks between the Chinese central government and the Dalai Lama. But the ambiguity did not give him flexibility as he had expected. Instead, he found himself in an embarrassing dilemma, irritating both China and those Europeans with anti-China sentiments.

Now the Sino-French relationship is back on the right track. More Europeans are starting to reflect upon themselves that the development of China presents an opportunity, not a threat. France has seen more clearly China's bottom line on protecting its core interests. That is a pleasant change.

GT: The spreading European sovereignty debt crisis may stall global economic recovery. Against this backdrop, how do you see the future aspects of the Sino- French relationship?

Cai: Three dominant factors determine the Sino-French relationship: the world situation, the balance of power between the two countries, and the personal factors of key political figures.

The spreading European debt crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity. China and France are in the same boat. With more interests overlapping, cooperation and coordination become easier.

The Sino-French relationship is never a zero-sum game. Some frictions or conflicts are natural. The healthy growth of bilateral ties is in the fundamental interests of both nations.

As early as the 1960s, Chairman Mao regarded developing nations as the "first intermediate zone," and the western European countries as the "second intermediate zone." In good times or bad times, we always see France as a strategic partner, never a rival.