Views of New York (left), the US, and Shanghai, China. Photos: VCG

Editor's note:

The state and trajectory of China-US ties, the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world, draw attention across the globe. Looking ahead to 2026, the international community continues to expect a stable and reliable relationship between the two major countries. Against this backdrop, the Global Times launches a series to engage with leading US experts and strategists. Through discussions on issues such as avoiding miscalculation and strengthening crisis management, the series explores pathways for both sides to meet each other halfway on the basis of equality, respect and mutual benefit which remains essential for a stable future for both countries and the world. In the second instalment of the series, Global Times (GT) reporters Liu Xuandi and Ma Ruiqian spoke with Brantly Womack (Womack), faculty senior fellow of Miller Center at the University of Virginia.

GT: Looking back, what key words would you use to describe the evolution of China-US relations in 2025 and why?

Womack: I believe the key phrase that best captures the situation is "what now?" It reflects a moment in which opportunities and challenges coexist, and where uncertainty defines the landscape. Things change week by week, not even in a simple back-and-forth way. 

GT: In late October, the two countries' presidents met in Busan and reached important consensus. What implications does the Busan meeting hold for the overall direction of China-US relations?

Womack: To properly understand China-US relations, it is essential to place them within the broader context of the US overall domestic and foreign policy. The current US government often makes strong policy statements, observes the reaction and then retreats from them if the other side does not submit or comply. This mind-set is not necessarily about achieving the best possible outcome, but about securing a deal. This deal-oriented mentality, rather than a strategy-driven one, has shaped US relations not only with China, but also with Canada and Europe. This pattern was evident: The US pursued aggressive tariff policies unilaterally and subsequently engaged in high-level discussions to arrive at a deal.

This also suggests that the US leader does recognize the realities of the global economy and international politics, as well as China's significance and the impracticality of trying to simply contain or diminish it. As a result, there has been a tendency to step back from initial tariff proposals. China is viewed simultaneously as a strategic rival and as an indispensable country that must be engaged and compromised with. Between these two loosely defined parameters, China-US relations vary and fluctuate. In this context, China has been wise to adopt a cautious approach and to engage directly at the highest level, as seen in Busan. 

GT: In the past 10 months, the two presidents held one meeting in person and spoke on the phone four times. To what extent does the head-of-state diplomacy open a window of opportunity for China-US relations?

Womack: I believe head-of-state diplomacy is extremely important. Personal, face-to-face engagement clearly matters, and direct, leader-level engagement can play a meaningful role in advancing bilateral diplomacy.

GT: You have previously spoken of the symbolic end of the "American Century," suggesting that Washington's framing has collapsed. Can you elaborate further on this?

Womack: The "American Century" had two core dimensions as the US understood it. One was leadership of a liberal international order centered on trade, economic development and sovereign states. The other was control - maintaining credibility through sanctions, military power and the ability to shape outcomes. In this sense, the American Century was both a period of global economic integration and a hegemonic era. Today, that era has passed. 

Global interaction has produced new forces, reduced America's relative position in the world economy and generated deep anxiety in the US. There remains a strong tendency to cling to military superiority, though this is no longer an effective approach. We are now in a post-hegemonic, collaborative century, where uncertainty cannot be resolved by domination but by cooperation and partnerships rather than rigid alliances.

In this new era, US policy toward China should be grounded in reality. The US remains a major global power, but it is no longer "in charge," and must adapt to cooperation and multilateral engagement. China, as the most significant of these partners, represents the most important bilateral relationship in today's global order. That adjustment, however, is psychologically difficult for any hegemonic power that faces the sense of losing control. The US will likely continue to make mistakes, but reality will impose limits. Efforts to contain or isolate China through tariffs or restrictions ultimately raise US inflation and risk self-isolation. The US cannot isolate China but only itself.

GT: Recently, the White House released its latest National Security Strategy (NSS), assessing that the US-China relationship "has transformed into one between near-peers." What's your take on this? 

Womack: I was very surprised by the tone of the NSS. It lacks a clear conclusion and does not read like a measured assessment of US foreign policy. Overall, the document expresses a particular mentality rather than a coherent strategy. Its overt substance is quite limited: It stays within two basic assumptions that the US cannot simply prevail over China, yet China is still viewed as a hostile competitor. The US is acting this way largely out of a sense of relative decline. If it continues to assert its remaining strength impulsively, that strength will diminish further. 

GT: Looking ahead to 2026, what kind of China-US relations does the international community expect or need to see? And what steps should both sides take to translate the Busan meeting's consensus into tangible outcomes?

Womack: I would say the relationship is likely to become relatively more positive, largely because of the announced plans for high-level meetings. I also think the US leader will face growing domestic challenges, which may distract him from policies that do not lead to tangible "deals." A confrontational China policy, in that sense, is unlikely to produce practical outcomes. As US wrong policies encounter real-world constraints, which prompt adjustments in its perceptions, some degree of stability in the bilateral relationship may be expected.

As for the next steps, the two sides should be aware that they have common interests in reducing risks. There will be many situations in which competition does not lead to one side winning, where a protocol of mutual restraint is the only rational solution. Strengthening people-to-people exchanges is also essential. Past joint efforts in this area have been highly valuable, particularly educational exchanges such as Chinese students studying in the US and, though in smaller numbers, American students in China.

I hope both countries work together to sustain a stable and healthy bilateral relationship that benefits the world. Even if cooperation faces uncertainties, openness should not be seen merely as a goodwill gesture. It is a policy that serves a country's own interests and benefits its relationships with the rest of the world.