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When US President Donald Trump paid his state visit to Beijing in May, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed that the US and China should build a "constructive relationship of strategic stability." At their September meeting in Washington, they reaffirmed that framework and specified that it should rest on "respect, fairness, and reciprocity." The leaders were not declaring an end to competition but acknowledging something more realistic: Competition needs a political framework to prevent it from drifting toward confrontation.

What exactly is strategic stability supposed to stabilize?

A more useful definition starts with the boundaries of competition: How it is conducted, what ends it serves and how far it is allowed to spread. The two sides can compete intensely without their chief objective being to undermine each other. They can take security measures without turning every area of economic and technological interaction into a national security battlefield. And they can disagree sharply over regional issues while keeping channels of communication, and even cooperation, open elsewhere.

A focus on stability is the factor that keeps competition from becoming a self-reinforcing escalation. This is why the Washington summit mattered. The Beijing meeting in May established a political framework for the relationship, and the September meeting and its aftermath offer a chance to give that framework greater continuity.

The significance of agreeing on a shared goal of stability goes beyond any single agreement. For much of the past decade, China-US diplomacy has too often followed a reactive pattern: Tensions rise, leaders intervene, relations improve, and another dispute interrupts the progress. 

Regular leader-level engagement could help turn crisis management into something closer to strategic management, giving officials on both sides political space to address problems before they become emergencies.

That would represent a meaningful change. The US and China are unlikely to resolve their biggest differences anytime soon, but they can become better at living with them.

The larger value of regular summits lies in meeting the expectations of the international community that the two nations could establish a more regular political rhythm - one in which competition continues, diplomacy remains active, and neither side needs a crisis before it sees a reason to engage.

If both sides strengthen themselves while also building clearer expectations, more reliable communication and better crisis management channels, stability can lower the risk that competition ends in conflict. 

The practical task, therefore, is to build shock absorbers into the relationship. The danger in China-US relations is that a problem in one area can still contaminate the whole relationship. For example, an export-control dispute can spill into security dialogue, and a cyber or AI-related security incident can quickly be interpreted through the lens of strategic hostility. A more resilient relationship would make such spillovers less automatic.  

That requires moving beyond summit-generated stability. The next phase should focus on turning presidential consensus into habits. 

Economic mechanisms should keep functioning even when negotiations become difficult. Military channels should remain open when political relations worsen. On AI, the two countries do not need a grand bargain before they can discuss shared terminology, major safety incidents, cyber risks and the role of human decision-making in high-consequence systems. Recent US-China economic talks have begun to address AI risks alongside traditional trade issues, suggesting such conversations are becoming more feasible.

Academic, business, local and student exchanges also deserve protection. At the Washington summit, Xi invited 100,000 young Americans to visit China for study and exchanges over the next five years. That initiative addresses a longer-term vulnerability in the relationship: the loss of firsthand knowledge about each other. Turning the invitation into sustained contact will require accessible programs, reliable travel arrangements and institutional support in both countries. 

Future summits may tackle individual or immediate problems, but the most meaningful outcome would be a China-US relationship that can absorb the next shock without having to be rebuilt from scratch.

The author is a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University and a council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies. The article was initially published in the US magazine Foreign Policy. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn