The proposed office premises for the BBNJ secretariat in Xiamen, China. Photo: Fan Wei/Global Times
The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) faces the task of determining the seat of the secretariat and the arrangements necessary for its functioning, including the modalities of the Clearing-House Mechanism.
Belgium and Chile have advanced a joint candidacy under which the principal functions of the secretariat would be located in Valparaiso while the physical and technical infrastructure of the Clearing-House Mechanism would operate from Brussels, with the additional suggestion that Brussels might also host meetings of subsidiary bodies. However, Belgium and Chile traded under the table what should be collectively determined by all Parties to the Agreement. This is a violation of the stipulations of the Agreement and an act of disrespect to the authority of COP.
In addition, a closer reading of the Agreement's institutional design, the record of comparable treaty practice and the operational implications of the proposed split reveal a series of structural difficulties that the conference would need to weigh carefully.
Articles 50 and 51 of the Agreement assign to the COP the responsibility for deciding the seat of the secretariat and the specific modalities for the operation of the Clearing-House Mechanism, which shall be determined by the COP. These provisions establish a deliberate sequence in which core institutional choices are reserved for collective determination after entry into force. The Belgium-Chile proposal compresses two distinct questions - the location of the secretariat and the physical home of the Mechanism's infrastructure - into a single pre-negotiated package. The Belgium-Chile proposal bundles the two together in an attempt to force it as a package upon other Parties. This is against applicable procedural rules and a hijack of the Parties' will.
The consistent practice of co-locating the secretariat and the Clearing-House Mechanism is not merely an institutional habit. It reflects the practical requirements of clear accountability, integrated management of information systems with policy and financial functions, and reduced friction in day-to-day operations.
No established precedent exists for a formal hosting package that places the main secretariat on one continent and the physical infrastructure of its primary Clearing-House Mechanism on another. While the Belgium-Chile proposal represents a degree of institutional innovation, it must be supported by a clear operational justification rather than merely serving the political convenience of combining two candidacies. A single-site arrangement, by contrast, remains consistent with the prevailing logic that has allowed other secretariats to function with relative clarity of responsibility.
Moreover, the geographic and temporal distance between Valparaiso and Brussels introduces persistent operational burdens that a single-site arrangement would avoid. Overlapping working hours are correspondingly limited, complicating timely responses to technical incidents, data-management issues or urgent administrative questions. Even extensive reliance on digital tools does not eliminate the consequences of formally designating a second city as the home of physical and technical infrastructure.
Responsibility for system performance, data security and service continuity would require ongoing demarcation between the main secretariat and the infrastructure host. These requirements create structural costs that accumulate over successive years. Resources and managerial attention that might otherwise be directed toward the substantive implementation of the Agreement risk being absorbed by internal coordination.
The joint proposal is most coherently understood as a response to competitive dynamics. Chile has long presented Valparaiso as a candidacy rooted in the Global South; Belgium has emphasized Brussels' established diplomatic and institutional capacity. By combining the two, the arrangement seeks to retain a Southern designation for the principal seat while securing a European role in the information mechanism and in the hosting of subsidiary-body meetings. However, according to the new proposal, Chile will no longer assume the substantive functions of the Secretariat. Belgium, for its part, only seeks to host the Clearing-House Mechanism and thereby has in effect relinquished its bid for the Secretariat seat.
By comparison, a single-site candidacy such as the one advanced for Xiamen, China, avoids the need to reconcile form and substance across different host countries. China's position as one of the first signatories and Parties to the Agreement and the largest assessed-contributor to its budget, together with concrete long-term commitments regarding premises, supports the practical viability of an integrated arrangement. Locating the secretariat in the Asia-Pacific would also contribute to geographic balance among ocean governance institutions without introducing the coordination frictions inherent in a trans-oceanic split. These features do not decide the question, but they illustrate how an integrated seat can address several of the difficulties the joint proposal itself creates.
The COP will ultimately decide; its choice should rest on the arrangement most likely to support the coherent operation of the Agreement over the long term.
The author is director of the Research Center for International and Regional Studies at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn