CHINA / SOCIETY
Associate professor sentenced to life for leaking core secrets of multiple key Chinese weapons systems to foreign spies
Published: Sep 02, 2025 07:34 PM
Data Security File. MSS issues a statement on its WeChat account on December 1, urging caution over sharing sensitive information online without declassification or risk evaluation. Such information may serve as a major source of open-source intelligence for foreign espionage agencies, which may potentially endanger national security. Photo: VCG

Data Security File. MSS issues a statement on its WeChat account on December 1, urging caution over sharing sensitive information online without declassification or risk evaluation. Such information may serve as a major source of open-source intelligence for foreign espionage agencies, which may potentially endanger national security. Photo: VCG


The "Baomi Guan" WeChat account overseen by China's National Administration of State Secrets Protection has released details of two recent espionage cases involving highly educated individuals who provided sensitive military and technological information to foreign intelligence agencies.

The first case involves a scholar surnamed Zhou, who focused on cutting-edge communication technology research and earned his PhD in 2006. When preparing to head to a foreign university for postdoctoral research, he disclosed his identity on his visa application and attached a copy of his doctoral thesis on advanced communication technology, which attracted the attention of foreign intelligence agencies.

During his time abroad, foreign spies repeatedly arranged meetings with him, offering substantial remuneration for working on their behalf, to which Zhou tacitly agreed. After returning to China, he continued supplying intelligence to them. At the time the investigation into him was initiated, Zhou was serving as an associate professor and master's supervisor at a Chinese university, leading a laboratory that undertook numerous classified research projects for national defense, military, and industrial units. 

The investigation revealed that Zhou provided foreign intelligence agencies with a large volume of highly classified data and documents, covering core secrets on the development status, combat performance, and technical parameters of multiple key Chinese weapons systems. Expert evaluation determined that these materials included more than 200 top-secret and secret-level documents. Zhou was sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage.

In the other case, a senior researcher at a Chinese military research institute surnamed Zhang has been sentenced to 15 years in prison for espionage. 

According to the release, in 2011, Zhang went to a Western country for an academic visit. During a seminar, he was approached by a man named Jack, who claimed to be a foreign military officer and said he had access to military projects. The project's relevance and technical overlap with Zhang's research made it highly appealing, and the two quickly found common ground.

Jack not only helped Zhang solve numerous personal and professional problems but also promised to assist with his daughter's overseas studies and residency. Later, Jack revealed that he worked for a foreign intelligence agency. Tempted by these offers, Zhang ultimately became an accomplice to espionage.

After returning to China, Zhang relentlessly gathered intelligence on the country's military-industrial sector, disclosing details about the development and research directions of advanced weapons systems without reservation.

In addition to releasing the cases, authorities warned the public to be alert when it comes to foreign intelligence tactics. Operatives often disguise themselves as "overseas scholars" or research collaborators, using academic exchanges and publication opportunities to gain access to sensitive information. 

Others pose as caring "close confidants," exploiting emotional vulnerabilities to earn trust and extract secrets. Some operate online as an "internet friend" on forums or social platforms, engaging targets through shared interests. 

Certain spies present themselves as wealthy business partners to recruit personnel from sensitive companies or government agencies, while others masquerade as consultants or part-time workers, using paid projects or information verification as a cover to gather intelligence or conduct surveillance in restricted areas related to the defense, military, or high-tech sectors.

Foreign intelligence operatives may also disguise themselves as journalists, visa officers, or NGO staff, among other identities, to approach and engage target individuals, said the release.


Global Times