Photo: Official WeChat account under China's National Administration of State Secret Protection

China's National Administration of State Secret Protection issued a warning case on Monday, stating that employees at government organs and institutions are frequently targeted by overseas espionage agencies due to their unique positions within the government and their access to sensitive information, according to an official WeChat account under the administration. 

According to the article, a government employee surnamed Lü, met a foreign man surnamed Li through a professional networking website in January 2021. Li claimed to work for an overseas research institution. During their first conversations, Li directly asked whether Lü worked for a government department, and Lü carelessly disclosed his workplace and job responsibilities.

Li later invited Lü to write articles and reports for so-called research projects and promised to pay him. Attracted by the high fees, Lü used materials from his workplace, personal files, online information and his own analysis to write articles on sensitive topics assigned by Li. He then sent these articles via email and receiving payments in return.

As their contacts and "cooperation" deepened, Li repeatedly asked for unpublished content and promised he would pay more. Although Lü began to feel uneasy and suspicious, he continued cooperating for the money.

Li later asked Lü to provide agreements, documents and other materials in his possession, promising even higher payments in return. By then, Lü had fully realized that Li was an overseas spy. However, fearing legal consequences and unwilling to face the truth, he continued photographing paper documents and sending the images to Li, while accepting the increasingly large payments he had been promised.

From early 2021 to the end of that year, Lü provided Li with 22 articles involving state secrets and intelligence information, receiving more than 20,000 yuan ($2,770) in payments. In June 2022, Lü turned himself in to state security authorities. He was subsequently held criminally liable for espionage.

The case revealed a clear and dangerous pattern, as well as common tactics used by overseas spies to target and recruit staff members at government organs and institutions, said the article. 

First, they often identify targets through social and professional platforms, approach them under fake identities, and lure them with offers of "research cooperation" and high payments. They then gradually escalate their demands, moving from public information to sensitive documents. 

By exploiting the targets' greed and then their fear, overseas spies slowly deeper in espionage activities. Once the target realizes something is wrong, the spies may further take advantage of their fear and panic to keep them trapped and prevent them from backing out.

The article urged government employees to stay vigilant against overseas espionage tactics, avoid casually disclosing sensitive work-related information online, verify suspicious contacts and cooperation requests, follow confidentiality rules and remain clear headed in the face of financial temptation.


Global Times