Illustration: VCG

When Ed Balls visited China's Hong Kong in 2006 as economic secretary to the treasury, he stepped into a world that no longer exists. China's GDP stood at around $2.8 trillion - roughly one eighth of America's. That year, 1 pound bought over 15 yuan; Beijing was still preparing for its 2008 Olympic moment; and high-speed rail, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Belt and Road Initiative had yet to exist. Meanwhile, Britain was enjoying its final years as a top-five global economy by nominal GDP, confident in the post-Cold War liberal order and in its "special relationship" as a reliable conduit between Washington and the world.

The world that UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper recently arrived in is unrecognizable from the one her husband (Ed Balls) once visited, and Britain's position within it has shifted just as profoundly. China has risen to rival or surpass the US in terms of purchasing power parity. Britain, by contrast, has slipped down the rankings, with its post-Brexit identity still being written. Cooper's visit to Beijing was not just a diplomatic courtesy call; it was, whether intended or not, a reckoning with changed realities.

This is a long-overdue arrival. Records show that this was Cooper's first official visit to China. Prime Minister Keir Starmer's January visit had reopened the highest-level dialogue. Britain needs a foreign secretary who prioritizes robust and productive relations with Beijing. These were not merely missed diplomatic opportunities; they were strategic own goals in a world where no major issue can be resolved without Chinese involvement.

The broader geopolitical context makes this engagement not merely desirable but urgent. An America that is openly transactional, skeptical of multilateral institutions, and willing to upend the very "rules-based order" that Britain has long invoked as its diplomatic lodestar means that London can no longer outsource its global positioning to Washington. The assumptions that underpinned British foreign policy for decades - that US leadership would set the terms and Britain would operate comfortably within them - are no longer assured. The UK must find new language and new partnerships to navigate what comes next. The space created by US transformation is precisely where a confident, strategic China-UK relationship can operate. Sitting out is not neutrality. It is strategic abdication.

One important message from the 11th China-UK Strategic Dialogue was the recognition that the two economies are often complementary rather than competitive. During the Dialogue, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi rightly noted that the outline of China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) is not only China's domestic development blueprint but also an opportunity list for the rest of the world, and it is highly aligned with the UK's modern industrial strategy. This reflects a genuine structural complementarity: China's manufacturing scale and technological ambition alongside Britain's strengths in financial services, life sciences, higher education and professional expertise.

London, as a global financial center, should be positioned to benefit from China's continued economic rise. Our comparative advantage lies not in factories but in the institutional architecture of global finance, law and professional services. That complementarity makes the bilateral relationship more striking, not less.

Differences in the two countries' values and political systems will persist, and no serious person in Britain pretends otherwise. However, the task of politicians is to manage those differences without sacrificing the mutual benefits that engagement makes possible. China's own experience demonstrates that countries with strong economies, stable governments, and leaderships that think in decades rather than electoral cycles earn more influence in the world, not less. Britain's government must now do more than facilitate; it must lead at home. This means equipping the British public with an honest and balanced account of what China represents: not a rival to be feared, but a reality of global politics. 

Inflation, stagnant growth and years of diminished productivity have left too many people feeling closed off from the future. A properly articulated China-UK relationship - one that speaks to jobs, investment, technology and education - is part of the answer to that anxiety. If Britain genuinely aspires to play in the premier league of international relations, it needs a population that understands the game. Cooper's visit is a meaningful start; however, the harder and more important task is bringing the UK with her - diplomacy at home, not just abroad. 

The author is a former Member of Parliament, vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary China Group, and a specialist in UK-China relations. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn