Illustration: Xia Qing/GT
Japan is certainly not a "stakeholder" in the South China Sea. Neither geographically nor legally does Japan have any connection to the region. However, since Japan insists on labeling itself as such, it is worth examining what these "interests" actually entail.Among the 14 countries that issued the so-called joint statement on the 10th anniversary of the South China Sea "arbitral tribunal award," Japan, other than the Philippines, the only direct party to the dispute, has been the most active agitator. Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi even claimed that Japan is a "legitimate stakeholder". What is more astonishing is that, even after China summoned the chief minister of the Japanese Embassy in China, Japanese media still reported that "Japan has refuted China's claims." Japan, which bears historical culpability in the South China Sea that has yet to be reckoned with, can hardly wait to extend its reach into these waters. Its ambition to revive militarism is laid bare, turning it into a "malignant tumor" that endangers regional security.
Is Japan a "stakeholder" in the South China Sea? Certainly not. Neither geographically nor legally does Japan have any connection to the region. However, since Japan insists on labeling itself as such, it is worth examining what these "interests" actually entail.
First, using the South China Sea as a testing ground for "remilitarization." In recent years, Japan has been gradually strengthening its presence in the region, with its actions becoming more systematic this year. For instance, Japan has deployed greater forces in multiple military exercises across the Pacific. Notably, 81 years after the end of World War II (WWII), it has for the first time dispatched combat personnel onto Philippine soil and fired offensive missiles abroad. Japan and the Philippines have also upgraded bilateral ties this year, formally initiating negotiations on a General Security of Military Information Agreement. Japan's right wing is using the Philippines as a "stepping stone" to accelerate its path toward "military unshackling", steadily advancing a form of "neo-militarism" in the Asia-Pacific.
Second, attempting to bind regional countries to its strategic chariot under the banner of the Japan-US alliance. Within the framework of the US' so-called "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and amid the backdrop of NATO's expansion into the Asia-Pacific, Japan's right wing has actively positioned itself as a vanguard in recent years. However, as the US adjusts its global strategic focus, Japan has instead become the more proactive party in stirring up tensions. Since the Takaichi administration took office, Japan has clearly grown dissatisfied with merely following Washington's lead. Instead, it is increasingly seeking to intervene in global security affairs, pushing for the Self-Defense Forces to operate globally and gradually moving toward becoming a "war-capable nation." At this year's Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi portrayed enhanced military cooperation as "supporting the Japan-US alliance," highlighting Tokyo's growing willingness to leverage the alliance for its own strategic ambitions.
Third, using efforts to constrain China as a pretext to cultivate conditions for remilitarization. For Japan, regional peace and prosperity are the greatest obstacles to its pursuit of "remilitarization." A strong China, meanwhile, remains the greatest anchor of peace and stability in the region. To that end, Japan has long sought to promote the so-called "three-seas linkage" around China's periphery, using the so-called "single theater" concept to constrain China from three directions - the East China Sea, the Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea. At the same time, it has vigorously promoted the "China threat" narrative and championed a revamped "free and open Indo-Pacific" vision, using maritime issues as a pretext to forge a containment ring around China. These moves run counter to the aspirations of the majority of regional countries, which seek peace and development.
Does Japan truly believe the so-called "South China Sea arbitration award" was fair and impartial? The answer is clearly no. By the award's own absurd logic, Taiping Island in China's Nansha Islands - covering about 500,000 square meters and capable of sustaining fresh water, crops, and poultry - is not considered an island entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf. If that is the standard, on what basis can Japan claim an EEZ and continental shelf spanning hundreds of thousands of square kilometers from Okinotorishima, which consists of only two tiny rocks with a total area of less than 10 square meters? This is not only a logical contradiction, but it is a blatant double standard. Japan's promotion of the arbitration award has nothing to do with fairness or justice. Rather, it is an opportunistic attempt to use the ruling as a legal pretext to pursue geopolitical advantage and interfere in regional affairs, further exposing the illegitimacy of the award itself.
By dressing up bloc confrontation as "the international rule of law" and disguising military expansion as "defense transparency," Japan is becoming one of the most dangerous and perhaps the most subtle destabilizing forces in the South China Sea. One defining feature of this "neo-militarism" is the use of the moderate language of modern legal governance to cloak military buildup and war preparations with an appearance of legitimacy. Notably, some voices in Southeast Asia's strategic and media circles argue that Japan no longer poses a threat because, unlike before WWII, it is no longer Asia's strongest power. Such claims are either misguided or driven by ulterior motives.
In reality, the cautious distance that most ASEAN countries maintain from Japan - and their silence on Japan's "enthusiastic proposals" - speaks for itself.
Since the end of WWII, Asian countries have, through sustained effort, achieved a historic transformation from postwar reconstruction to rapid economic growth, making the region one of the world's major engines of development.
This year marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also kown as the Tokyo Trials. Yet Japan, once an aggressor, has failed to undertake genuine reflection on its wartime crimes.
Instead, under various pretexts, it has returned to the South China Sea to project military influence and attempted to subject the South China Sea once again to the poison of militarism. Regional countries should remain highly vigilant. The South China Sea should remain a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation, and must not become fertile ground for the resurgence of Japan's "neo-militarism."