Illustration:Xia Qing/GT

By August 1, China and India had resumed border trade through the Nathu La pass in implementation of the consensus reached at the 24th Round of Talks Between the Special Representatives of China and India on the Boundary Question in August 2025. The pass' reopening is widely regarded as a positive sign of improving China-India relations. But if we look beyond the word "reopening," one fact becomes clear: The route should have reopened long ago. 

The reopening of the border trade route that should never have become an issue is less a breakthrough than a "belated return to normalcy." More importantly, however, the deeper change has taken place in the underlying structure of China-India relations. The very nature of the China-India relationship today has changed - from a relationship between two major powers, neighboring countries and developing nations in the conventional sense to one between two poles in a multipolar world. Such a transformation has never before occurred in the history of China-India relations.

Historically, China-India relations evolved within a hegemonic order structure. During the Cold War, relations between China and India were overshadowed by the strategic rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the two countries proceeded along different strategic trajectories. In that era, China-India relations remained essentially a regional bilateral relationship and did not enter the top tier of the global power structure.

Today, the situation is different. China has become the world's second-largest economy, while the gap in comprehensive national strength between China and the US continues to narrow. India has become one of the world's fastest-growing major economies, with an economy roughly comparable in size to that of the UK, and its rise as a major power is gradually becoming a tangible reality. 

When two countries of such immense population and economic scale, both possessing independent strategic will, stand simultaneously at the center of the world stage, their relationship is no longer simply a matter of managing relations between neighbors. What was once a bilateral issue has become a global one. The implications of this transformation go far beyond the reopening of the border pass. Thus, adjustments should be made accordingly.

First, the conventional thinking that China-India relations have a "ceiling" needs to be updated. In the past, it was often said that there was a ceiling on the relationship, with structural constraints limiting the extent to which ties could improve. But under the framework of a relationship between two poles, this "ceiling" mentality itself deserves rethinking. Relations between two poles should not be defined primarily by traditional security issues. If China and India, as two poles in the same multipolar world, need six years to restore a border trade route, then the maturity level of their relationship is vastly inadequate relative to its historical role.

Second, India needs to reassess "China's presence in South Asia." Much of India's security anxiety has stemmed from an outdated analytical framework that views every aspect of China's presence in the region as an attempt at strategic encirclement. However, in a multipolar world, China's economic presence in South Asia represents a natural extension of its development rather than a strategy of containment. Instead of attempting to prevent this trend, India would be better served by considering how to strike a balance between competition and cooperation.

Third, the cyclical pattern of turbulence in China-India relations must be broken. Historically, the relationship has gone through a cycle of crisis and rapprochement roughly once in a certain period. This recurring pattern has imposed enormous costs on both countries. It has prevented them from making long-term strategic plans. In the era of multipolarity, the cost of continuing this pattern will no longer be merely tactical - it will be strategic. Every unnecessary confrontation consumes valuable resources that could otherwise be devoted to shaping a multipolar world order.

The resumption of border trade is undoubtedly a positive development. It indicates that China-India relations are moving in a clearer direction. Even so, in the face of a relationship that has already undergone a structural transformation, an approach of "taking small steps and moving slowly" is no longer sufficient. 

What China and India need is a strategic vision and institutional arrangements commensurate with their new historical standing. Should they establish a stable positioning and framework for a relationship between two poles, or allow the relationship to remain a strategic burden on their respective paths toward sustainable rise? The time to make that choice is indeed approaching.

Zhang Jiadong is director and professor of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University. Yang Yabo is director and research fellow of the Institute of South Asia Studies at the Xizang Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn