Illustration: Xia Qing/GT

Recently, the Carter Center and Emory University in the US released the results of a survey, in which Chinese mainland respondents' views on the Taiwan question have drawn attention both on the island and internationally.

The survey, which reportedly involved 2,500 respondents, shows that 83 percent of mainland participants support strengthening cross-Straits cultural exchanges, 82 percent support promoting trade, and 66 percent support seeking a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question through official negotiations. 

However, under the hypothetical scenario of "the Taiwan region formally declaring independence," respondents' attitudes shifted significantly: 77 percent supported limited military action, while 56 percent supported economic sanctions against the Taiwan region.

The authenticity and objectivity of this poll require further verification and confirmation, but the views of the mainland public on cross-Straits relations have long been stable and clear. People on the Chinese mainland cherish the historical, cultural, and kinship ties across the Straits and support fostering mutual understanding through exchange and cooperation - on the premise that both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one and the same China. Chinese mainland society harbors goodwill toward Taiwan compatriots, yet its red line regarding "Taiwan independence" separatist forces is equally clear.

Any interpretation that emphasizes only the Chinese mainland's desire for peace while sidestepping the consequences of "Taiwan independence" crossing that red line will lead the residents on the Taiwan island to make erroneous and dangerous judgments.

I. Misinterpretations by Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao and Taiwan island's United Daily News

When reporting on this poll, Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao directly linked "if the Taiwan region were to become independent" with "the majority of Chinese mainland respondents support limited military actions" in its headline, emphasizing "limited military actions." The United Daily News in Taiwan, meanwhile, ran a report titled "US poll shows Chinese mainland residents favor peaceful resolution of cross-Straits issues," further introducing the content into Taiwan's public discourse.

While the media certainly has the freedom to choose headlines and report news, the poll's findings regarding the call for peace, cross-Straits cultural ties, and opposition to "Taiwan independence" separatist forces if they cross the line, should all be presented in full rather than in a biased manner. If reports only one-sidedly emphasize that "Chinese mainland people favor peace," Taiwan's public may develop three misconceptions: that the Chinese mainland will issue only verbal warnings; that cross-Straits exchanges can offset the risks of "Taiwan independence"; and that the US and other external forces will bear the consequences on Taiwan's behalf.

Such selective reporting objectively risks misleading the public. The complete logic truly reflected by the survey is this: Chinese mainland residents are willing to improve cross-Straits relations through peaceful means, while simultaneously opposing any forces seeking to separate Taiwan from China.

II. The Anti-Secession Law elevates the fight against "Taiwan independence" to the level of national law

The Chinese mainland's fundamental stance on the Taiwan question has long formed a unified system comprising national law, political will, and social consensus.

The Anti-Secession Law, adopted in 2005, explicitly stipulates that in the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This means that if the Taiwan region were to declare the so-called "independence," it would trigger serious legal consequences at the national level. The nature of the issue would also escalate from a political disagreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to a fight against secession aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Chinese mainland is willing to leave room for peaceful reunification but has already established legal red lines that cannot be crossed. Opposing "Taiwan independence" and separatism is the shared will of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people, and safeguarding national unity also serves the fundamental interests of the vast majority of peace-loving people, including the compatriots in the Taiwan region.

Should the Taiwan region formally declare "independence," the Chinese mainland will take countermeasures in accordance with the law and the development of the situation; the specific methods, scope, and pace of these actions will depend on the facts and decisions at that time, and no force has the right to set limits on the Chinese mainland's countermeasures.

III. The Chinese mainland's desire for peace must not be misinterpreted as indulgence of "Taiwan independence"

This public opinion poll released by the US side is by no means a political shield for "Taiwan independence" forces. Some media outlets interpret the Chinese mainland public's desire for peace as tolerance for "Taiwan independence" and misconstrue the Chinese mainland's goodwill toward our compatriots in Taiwan as concessions to separatist forces. Such perceptions seriously deviate from public opinion on the Chinese mainland and the law.

Chinese mainland citizens are willing to engage in exchanges because compatriots across the Straits share a common history, culture, and ethnic ties; Chinese mainland society opposes "Taiwan independence" because national sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible. These two attitudes together constitute Chinese mainland society's comprehensive understanding of the Taiwan question.

Relevant US agencies may influence Taiwan society through public opinion polls, media coverage, and political rhetoric, and certain media outlets may choose their reporting angles, but they cannot bear the consequences of Taiwan's secession on its behalf, cannot alter the legal validity of the Anti-Secession Law, and certainly cannot sway the Chinese mainland's unwavering resolve to uphold national unity.

Peace can be pursued, but red lines must not be tested; cross-Straits exchanges are possible, but "Taiwan independence" is a dead-end path.