Illustration: Liu Xiangya/GT

Since the beginning of this year, the Quad, the core mechanism of the Indo-Pacific strategy led by the US, has shown a clear sense of "military fervor" and "political coldness" in its cooperation focus, which has called into question the future of this minilateral bloc.

On the military front, security cooperation under the Quad framework has deepened into a regularized, multi-tiered system. In the first week of November, India hosted the "Cope India" joint air force exercise, with the United States as the core participant and Japan and Australia joining as observers. Meanwhile, Exercise Malabar 2025 brought together the navies of the four nations in Guam for one of the biggest Quad naval drills in the Pacific from October 28 to November 8. 

In stark contrast, the Quad faces significant obstacles in political coordination. For instance, the Quad leaders' summit, the highest-level political coordination mechanism, was originally scheduled for the end of this year in India but was postponed to early 2026, apparently due to recent tensions between New Delhi and Washington. This not only undermines the continuity of strategic dialogue among the four countries but also reveals insufficient consensus among member states on broader issues. 

The Quad's current state of "strengthened military cooperation but weakened political coordination" stems from multiple structural contradictions.

First, the misalignment of strategic priorities. The differing geopolitical interests among Quad members create coordination challenges. India, for instance, has long adhered to the principle of "strategic autonomy," maintaining a balanced approach with the US, Japan and Australia in security cooperation while preserving close ties with Russia. However, the US seeks to bind its allies within the Quad framework to align with its Indo-Pacific strategy. This tension between "balancing interests" and "dominant intentions" directly manifests in the volatility of India-US relations. When friction arises between India and the US on bilateral issues, the Quad's political agenda becomes the first to suffer.

Second, the dual dilemma of informality and flexibility. The Quad employs an "informal dialogue mechanism" without formal treaty constraints. While this flexibility initially fostered cooperation among the four nations during its early stages, its drawbacks have become increasingly apparent as strategic objectives evolved. 

Third, there are diverging security priorities among Quad members toward China. The formation and development of the Quad in recent years were largely driven by external pressures such as shifting regional power dynamics, particularly the shared need to counter China's rise. As the situation evolves, differences in security concerns toward China have become apparent. For instance, India's security focus remains centered on the China-India border dispute and its claim to the Indian Ocean. With the current thaw in China-India relations, New Delhi prefers to resolve bilateral tensions through engagement and dialogue rather than positioning the Quad as an anti-China alliance. While Australia prioritizes South China Sea shipping lanes and collaborates closely with the US on security matters, its economic reliance on resource exports to China makes it reluctant to maintain strained relations. 

Fourth, military cooperation demonstrates greater operational feasibility and technical sophistication compared to political coordination. For instance, joint military exercises have clearly defined tactical objectives that can be progressively implemented through standardized processes such as joint training, equipment interoperability and personnel contact. In contrast, political coordination involves broader issues including economic interest distribution, multilateral relationship management, and strategic communication and compromise, which are far more complex and sensitive than military matters.

This "military fervor and political coldness" reflects the Quad mechanism's lack of deep strategic consensus, with its cooperation largely driven by external pressure. As the Quad's dominant power, the US' "America First" policy inherently conflicts with the security framework it seeks to establish, which has become the key cause of the Quad's "limping" status.

Looking ahead, given the well-established nature of the US-Japan, US-Australia and AUKUS military alliances, among others, the Quad's long-term viability would be challenged if it relies solely on military cooperation without achieving tangible results in political and economic spheres. This could reduce it to a mere formality, with its limping status becoming the norm.

The author is a senior research fellow at the National Strategic Institute, Tsinghua University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn