Illustration: VCG

Editor's Note: 

The year 2026 marks the commencement of China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30), a pivotal phase in the nation's medium- to long-term development. A successful venture starts with a good plan and with clear goals set. At this critical juncture, where a profound restructuring of the global order converges with a tipping point in the technological revolution, China's Five-Year Plan is poised to inject momentum and certainty into global development, charting a steady course for the new journey ahead.

In its "New Blueprint, New Opportunities" series, the Global Times (GT) invites Nobel laureates in economics, former central bank governors, core decision-makers of international organizations and renowned economists from countries with diverse civilizations, different economic systems and stages of development to deeply analyze how the 15th Five-Year Plan will reshape the underlying logic of China's interaction with the world and to explore the "anchor of certainty" and "new paradigm of development" this plan offers to a turbulent world.

In the 11th installment of the series, GT reporter Wang Wenwen talked to Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo (Belluzzo), a Brazilian economist at BPCT Consultoria Econômica, an economic consulting firm based in São Paulo, Brazil. Belluzzo shared his insights on the highlights of China's 15th Five-Year Plan and its implications for the Global South countries, in particular Brazil. 

GT: You have long argued that the state is indispensable for development. How do you assess the 15th Five-Year Plan as a state-led development initiative?

Belluzzo: I view the 15th Five-Year Plan as a remarkable unfolding of the strategic planning trajectory conducted by the Chinese government. In contrast to neoliberal hegemony and the premises of neoclassical theory, China demonstrates substantial institutional progress by synergistically integrating state coordination with market dynamics. In this unique framework, the state does not act as a mere spectator, but as an active agent of economic activity: It fosters entrepreneurship, empowers business owners and directs private capital toward national development goals. 

The 15th Five-Year Plan deepens this dynamic by steering planning toward technological sovereignty, the transition to clean energy, and the strengthening of the domestic market, driven by a new industrial and digital infrastructure. By aligning state incentives with productive growth, Beijing mitigates external volatilities and consolidates a well-articulated structure for economic and social development. 

Thus, far from stifling private initiative, the Chinese model instrumentalizes it through long-term public planning. The state converts macroeconomic coordination into the main engine of innovation, productivity gains and financial stability, establishing a robust alternative to classical market dogmas.

GT: Some Chinese economists view the 15th Five-Year Plan period as a time for China to accelerate the internationalization of the yuan. How do you see this prospect? What would it mean for emerging economies like Brazil? 

Belluzzo: The prospect of accelerating the internationalization of the yuan during the 15th Five-Year Plan reflects the maturation of China's geoeconomic role on the global stage. However, rather than being a direct replacement for the dollar's hegemony, we are witnessing the gradual building of an alternative international financial architecture. To a certain extent, this movement revives and updates the Keynesian logic debated at Bretton Woods, which advocated for global liquidity detached from the domestic imperatives of a single power's currency.

Chinese monetary diplomacy advances with pragmatism and prudence, leveraging its substantial commercial density. The fostering of Panda Bonds in the Asian capital market by emerging countries such as Brazil exemplifies this gradualist strategy. This process enables productive financing and bilateral trade in local currencies, thereby mitigating contagion risks stemming from fluctuations in US monetary policy.

For Brazil and other emerging economies, this gradual transition expands and visualizes new channels of liquidity. Allowing and encouraging fundraising in yuan offers a concrete alternative for financing infrastructure and sustainable projects without imposing sudden shocks on the global financial system. This is a long-term strategy grounded in China's historical patience and the reconfiguration of international finance.

GT: Which sectors of China's development in the next five years interest you the most?

Belluzzo: I am particularly interested in China's accelerated advancement at the frontier of Industry 4.0, robotics and artificial intelligence - domains in which the country achieves a productive level that rivals and, in multiple aspects, surpasses that of the US. However, the great distinguishing feature of the Chinese model lies not only in its scale of innovation, but also in its diplomatic and structural perspective.

While the traditional hegemonic pattern tends toward the enclosure of patents and the retention of critical technologies, the Chinese stance exhibits a universalist vocation. This was evident in the recent 2026 World AI Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance in Shanghai. Beijing explicitly states its willingness to provide developing countries with 5,000 opportunities in AI training and seminar programs.

For emerging economies such as Brazil, this global vision of development opens strategic avenues. Access to Chinese high-tech supply chains and cutting-edge technical cooperation offers Global South countries a concrete opportunity to upgrade their technological standards, shaping a new international architecture guided by the transfer of capabilities and shared prosperity.

GT: In your view, does China's development planning offer an alternative development narrative to the Washington Consensus that has historically influenced Latin America?

Belluzzo: Yes. We are witnessing an international projection of China that contrasts with the paradigm of the Washington Consensus. While the liberal guidelines of the 1990s imposed fiscal conditionalities and state retrenchment, the Chinese model is structured around a global vision of productive integration, guided by a more balanced relationship with partner countries.

This dynamic materializes in Brazil through the pragmatic entry into the industrial space vacated by North American and European automakers, as demonstrated by the establishment of electric vehicle and green technology production hubs by BYD. Far from limiting itself to the mere export of primary commodities or the influx of speculative capital, the Chinese presence advances into the manufacturing sector and infrastructure.

The establishment of this technological and productive space consolidates an alternative development narrative for Latin America. By combining international cooperation with industrial deepening and the transfer of technical capacity, China presents a universalist arrangement that is institutionally more advanced and fundamentally different from the Washington Consensus.

GT: Looking ahead to 2030, when the 15th Five-Year Plan achieves its major objectives, how do you think China's role in the global economy - particularly in relation to the Global South - might have changed? And what would that mean for Brazil specifically?

Belluzzo: When the objectives of the 15th Five-Year Plan are achieved by 2030, China's projection in the global economy will consolidate a profoundly innovative form of structuring international relations, with direct impacts on the Global South.

When analyzing the evolution of the international economic system since the 19th century, it becomes clear that China departs from historical patterns of hegemony centered on financial subordination or simple resource extraction. The Chinese model proposes a denser and more shared integration, connecting its domestic planning to the development of partner countries' productive capabilities.

For Brazil, the consolidation of this arrangement in 2030 represents an opportunity to plan its external insertion through long-term partnerships in infrastructure, energy transition and reindustrialization. By rejecting traditional liberal recipes and prioritizing state and productive cooperation, the Chinese strategy offers the Global South a pragmatic alternative for increasing its productivity and strengthening its autonomy on the international stage.