A view of the Taiwan Straits is seen from Xiamen port, in East China's Fujian Province. Photo: IC

Recently, something unusual has emerged in public opinion across the Taiwan Straits.

Li Ci-ze, an associate professor at National Changhua University of Education in Taiwan region, published three consecutive articles on the mainland WeChat public account "Zhengdangshi," focusing on the "one country, two systems" policy and attempting to spell out post-reunification institutional arrangements in concrete terms. Shen Yi, a professor at Fudan University, subsequently responded. Readers and netizens on both sides of the Straits have engaged in extensive discussion; Taiwan media and scholars have continued to follow up, debating issues such as autonomy, the judiciary, the military, security, public finance, and external affairs under "two systems." Taiwan region's media outlet China Times has reposted and commented on related content no fewer than seven times, while Taiwan region's media outlet Want Daily took special note in an editorial titled "Welcoming rational cross-Straits discussion on the question of reunification." On September 6, China Times carried a column by Yan Mo, "Unable to govern oneself, yet afraid of being governed," responding to professor Li's articles; on September 8, Li countered with "Being able to change does not mean being changed."

On September 9, at a regular press conference, Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office responded to this new trend of rational civil discussion on reunification, stating that reunification is an unstoppable historical trend. For compatriots from Taiwan island, it is not a question of choice, but one that must be answered. We are pleased to see more compatriots from Taiwan island facing up to reunification, beginning to learn about and discuss the specific content of the "one country, two systems" policy, and offering suggestions and proposals for it through various channels. "It is normal to have different opinions and debates between people on the mainland and Taiwan in the process," Chen said. "We believe more of our compatriots in Taiwan region will break free from the ideological constraints and 'information cocoons' created by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities, and increasingly recognize the advantages of the 'one country, two systems' and the inclusiveness of the Taiwan solution it offers," he said.

What matters most about this round of discussion is not which side wins the war of words, nor whether either side has already produced a fully mature, uncontested plan. Rather, it is that, for the first time, people on both sides are trying to move the discussion of reunification from slogans, emotions, and abstract positions, and toward institutions, powers and responsibilities, and real-world boundaries.

This step is particularly valuable at a time when Taiwan region is under the shadow of a "green terror." It may look like just a few articles, several rounds of exchanges, and a flood of comments. But viewed in the broader trajectory of cross-Straits relations, a door that has long remained closed is now being pushed open by forces from civil society.

I. What matters is not the absence of differences, but the willingness to confront them

For years, civil discussions on reunification across the Straits have featured many principled statements, clear expressions of attitude, and no shortage of historical and legal arguments. However, it only touches briefly on specific issues such as how governance would be carried out after reunification, how systems would be linked, how power would be allocated, how people's rights and interests would be safeguarded, and how national security would be ensured. Put plainly, past discussions have focused more on "whether to reunify" than on "what happens after reunification."

This time, however, the discussion is entering deeper waters.

Li Ci-ze's contribution is not a simple "yes" or "no," but a conditional reasoning: if the two sides of the Straits were to enter peaceful political consultations and eventually address institutional arrangements after national reunification, how should Taiwan society's concerns - democratic elections, judicial authority, basic rights, financial systems, local governance, security guarantees, and international participation - be handled? Where should the boundary between central and local authorities lie? How can institutional commitments be made credible?

Regardless of whether people agree with the specific propositions, this approach of laying out issues for item-by-item discussion carries inherent ice-breaking significance. When reunification is brought to the table in this manner, many concrete questions long obscured by emotions, prejudices and mutual imaginaries can finally enter a real space for joint discussion among people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

Differences will not disappear quickly, but only through candid exchange can they eventually be addressed.

II. When Taiwan scholars 'pose the questions' and mainland scholars 'take them up,' the discussion comes alive

A meaningful discussion cannot be one-sided, nor can it consist of each side simply repeating entrenched positions. This debate has drawn sustained attention not only because Li took the initiative to propose institutional ideas, but also because mainland scholars and readers did not shy away from sensitive issues and instead responded directly to core disagreements.

Li's initial argument can be seen as a kind of "conditional stress test": Taiwan region first lays out the systems and rights it hopes to retain, then observes what constraints the mainland would be willing to accept, in order to assess the credibility of a "one country, two systems" policy. This reflects a longstanding political psychology in Taiwan region - concern over whether future commitments would be honored and whether the mainland might unilaterally alter arrangements. Such concerns are understandable, but if the discussion is to move to the institutional level, it cannot remain a one-way test.

It is precisely on this point that the positive responses from Shen Yi and many mainland readers largely elevate the discussion from "Taiwan region putting forward institutional demands" to a higher plane: "the two sides jointly deliberating on rights and obligations." If Taiwan society may test the mainland's sincerity, then mainland society likewise has the right to ask in return: does Taiwan region genuinely accept national reunification? Is it prepared to shoulder the national obligations after reunification? Is it willing to accept the institutional arrangements that apply to it on matters of national security, national defense, foreign affairs, countering secession and resisting external interference?

At that point, the discussion truly comes alive.

Where does autonomy derive from? From the Constitution and authorization by the central government, or from some notion of inherent local power? How should final judicial authority be arranged so as to preserve ordinary civil and commercial order while ensuring that matters of national security, defense, and foreign affairs are not fully localized? How should the military and defense be handled to avoid creating two competing centers of power within one country? How much room should remain for financial systems, land policy, social welfare, and local governance? And how should the boundary be drawn between international functions and the state's external representation?

These questions are not entirely new, but rarely have they been so openly, concretely, and persistently presented to readers on both sides for systematic discussion.

III. More valuable than the exchange of words is the correction that followed

If the discussion had amounted to nothing more than a verbal back-and-forth, with each side making its case and labeling the other, its significance would have been quite limited. What truly demonstrates the value of rational debate is the willingness to gradually revise one's views in response to criticism and questioning.

According to Shen Yi's analysis and review of the discussion, Li Ci-ze made significant adjustments to his original framework after facing concentrated criticism from readers in the Chinese mainland. For example, his initial formulation that "powers expressly enumerated for the central government belong to the center, while powers not enumerated belong to Taiwan region" could easily be understood as implying that "Taiwan region inherently possesses a complete set of original powers." In subsequent discussions, however, Li acknowledged that China is a unitary state, and that Taiwan region's extensive autonomy must derive from the national Constitution and authorization by the National People's Congress, rather than constituting another set of original powers on an equal footing with those of the central government.

Similarly, his initial discussion of "credible commitments" focused primarily on whether Beijing might alter Taiwan region's autonomy arrangements in the future. In subsequent articles, Li went further in acknowledging that credible commitments must be reciprocal: the Taiwan region side would likewise need to assume responsibilities such as opposing separatism, rejecting external military intervention, refraining from joining foreign military alliances, not accepting foreign military command, and fulfilling national security obligations.

This back-and-forth interaction is crucial. It shows that the discussion is no longer simply a case of "Taiwan region speaks and the mainland listens," nor merely "the mainland criticizes and Taiwan region rebuts." Instead, a more constructive chain of interaction is beginning to emerge: questions are raised, challenges are encountered, formulations are revised, and frameworks are reconstructed. This is precisely what a serious, rational, and equal public discussion should look like.

What is truly worth cherishing is not a polished statement designed to cater to emotions, but the willingness to refine abstract positions into institutional frameworks that can be discussed, tested, and corrected; and the willingness to revise one's own views and continue the argument in the face of disagreement, rather than immediately closing the door to dialogue.

IV. This grassroots dialogue brings the question of reunification from imagination to reality

An editorial in Want Daily made a noteworthy observation: the environment surrounding cross-Straits discussions of reunification is changing. In the 1990s, Taiwan society engaged relatively extensively in discussions about reunification, constitutional arrangements, and future institutional frameworks. Today, however, as the balance of comprehensive strength across the Straits, the international environment, and social perceptions have changed, the mainland has become increasingly confident and better positioned to discuss institutional arrangements following reunification, while in Taiwan society, the very word "reunification" is often regarded as a highly sensitive topic, or even one that is difficult to discuss openly.

There are, of course, profound reasons behind this, including changes in the balance of power across the Straits and the international environment. More importantly, however, it exposes a long-standing problem: for too long, the two sides have often been "imagining each other." Some people in Taiwan region imagine that the mainland can only offer slogans and has no interest in discussing concrete arrangements; some people on the mainland imagine that Taiwan region will only reject them and has no intention of engaging in institutional discussions at all. The result is that both sides have been making assumptions about the other, while rarely putting the actual issues on the table.

This time, at least, there have been some changes.

The genuine concerns of Taiwan society have been articulated: ways of life, institutional continuity, judicial safeguards, basic rights, property rights, security arrangements, financial and monetary systems, and international functions. The mainland's core concerns have also been clearly identified: the one-China principle, national sovereignty, central authority, national security, the responsibility to oppose separatism, the risk of external interference, and the common obligations that would follow reunification.

Once these issues are brought into the open and addressed directly, the question of reunification is no longer merely a clouded and distant notion. Instead, it becomes a real-world issue that, while undoubtedly complex, can be broken down and discussed point by point.

That is why this can be described as a first step. Not because a consensus has already been reached, but because a step that had long proved difficult to take has finally been taken. 

V. Keep talking about reunification, air the differences, draw the lines

The first step has already been taken. What follows should be a second step, then a third - each one making the path firmer and wider.

First, keep the discussion going. Do not push it back into taboo. The more consequential the reunification question is, the less it can be handled by emotion alone. The more complicated it is, the more it needs to be broken into concrete institutional questions and talked through one by one.

Second, put "power" and "responsibilities" on the table together. Taiwan society's concerns about way of life, social institutions, property rights, legal protections and local governance should be heard and answered in earnest. At the same time, national reunification, the security red line, and the duty to oppose secession and outside interference must be written clearly into any institutional framework. Rights without responsibilities cannot be implemented; responsibilities without rights will not win public consent. A durable arrangement for reunification has to balance sovereignty and security with people's livelihoods and institutional concerns.

Third, look at the "ought" and the "is" side by side. Anyone can sketch an idealized design. Institutions, however, cannot be built apart from the real balance of power and the conditions on the ground. The Chinese mainland, cross-Straits relations and the Taiwan question today are no longer what they were in the 1990s. Shifts in strength and circumstance will set the practical limits of any arrangement. Plans that ignore reality slide into wishful thinking; talk of reality that dodges disagreement will not win hearts.

Finally - and most important - value the willingness and the ability of the two sides to sit down and talk. Differences will remain; some arguments may grow sharper than today's. What should truly worry us is not disagreement itself, but a retreat into information cocoons, where each side only imagines, misreads and rejects the other from inside its own story.

Reunification will not grow out of empty slogans, nor will it fall into place after a single debate. It can take shape only as successive discussions move closer to reality, to institutions, to responsibility and to people's hearts - and, step by step, talk out a path and a method.

VI. One step taken, many more become possible

Looking back, this discussion may still be rough. Many views need more work; many institutional designs remain deeply contested; many key questions have only just come into view. That does not diminish its significance.

It has moved the "one country, two systems" policy from an abstract slogan toward institutional questions. It has allowed Taiwan society's concerns to be raised in more concrete terms. And it has prompted mainland scholars and the public to respond openly to the rights, duties, boundaries and risks that would follow reunification.

Once a question is taken seriously, a crucial first step toward an answer has already been made. In history, the changes that matter most do not always begin with a bang. They often start by opening a crack, then taking a small step - and only then becoming a longer road.

If this step stays steady, solid, reasoned and sustained, later discussion can bring the "one country, two systems" policy closer to the ground - and make it something ordinary people in Taiwan can see and feel.