A view of the Taiwan Straits is seen from Xiamen port, in East China's Fujian Province. Photo: IC

Recently, online discussions among people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits surrounding the "one country, two systems" framework for Taiwan region have attracted widespread attention. On Wednesday, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office said at a regular press conference that the Chinese mainland welcomed growing discussion in Taiwan about national reunification and a proposed "one country, two systems" framework for the island. The following day, Liang Wen-chieh, the deputy head of Taiwan's so-called "Mainland Affairs Council," responded to several institutional conditions proposed by Li Ci-ze, an associate professor at National Changhua University of Education in Taiwan region, by claiming that he did not believe the Communist Party of China (CPC) would agree to a single one of them. 

Faced with a public discussion that has already delved into institutional arrangements, the "Mainland Affairs Council" has offered no institutional response. Instead, it has tried to end the discussion with a predetermined conclusion. This reveals precisely how uneasy and lacking in confidence it is.

Questioning is not the problem; replacing arguments with conclusions is

Li proposed democratic elections, final judicial adjudication, no stationing of troops, the retention of necessary self-defense capabilities, and confirmation through Taiwan society's legally prescribed procedures. This does not mean that these proposals are beyond dispute, nor does it mean they can become future institutional arrangements without discussion. On the contrary, each involves major and complex questions: How would powers and responsibilities be divided between the central and local governments after reunification? What would be the source and limits of a high degree of autonomy? How could the judicial system both address concerns in Taiwan society over the protection of rights and safeguard the unity of the national legal system? How should defense arrangements ensure national security and regional stability? And how should rights protections, national obligations, responsibilities to oppose secession and resist external interference be incorporated into an institutional framework?

None of these questions can be answered with slogans. Liang is perfectly entitled to disagree with Li's conditions and to point out contradictions in his proposals at the legal, political and security levels. But saying that "not a single one" would be accepted does not explain which conditions touch on fundamental principles, which remain open to discussion, or which could be addressed through different institutional designs. It does not engage with the questions themselves; instead, it declares in advance that they are not worth discussing. This is clearly an attempt to evade the substance of the matter and muddle through the issue.

The greater the distrust, the greater the need for consultation

Liang's fallacy that "the CPC cannot be trusted" is a result of the long-standing "de-Sinicization" and stigmatization of the Chinese mainland by the DPP authorities. Taiwan society can indeed have concerns about whether future institutional commitments would be honored, whether rights protections would remain stable, and whether its way of life would change. Such concerns cannot be dismissed, much less simply written off as emotions or prejudice.

But concerns should not become a reason to reject discussions. On the contrary, the more distrust there is between the two sides, the more important it is to clarify conditions, boundaries, procedures and safeguards. If there are concerns that commitments might not be honored, then there is even greater reason to continue questioning provisions of particular concern or controversy. Abstractly saying "trust" or "distrust" cannot substitute for institutional design. Truly responsible politics does not require either side to abandon its doubts. Rather, it acknowledges those doubts and, on that basis, establishes clearer safeguards against risks.

What Professor Li has undertaken is precisely a conditional deduction: putting forward the concerns of Taiwan society, identifying the institutional questions that need answers, and then seeing how the Chinese mainland responds. Such an approach may not produce all the answers immediately, but it at least allows statements to be put to the test and brings questions into public discussions. Compared with Liang's approach of preemptively rejecting the other side's position, putting the questions on the table would clearly be more conducive to helping Taiwan residents understand the facts and safeguarding corresponding interests and rights.

The Hong Kong experience is complex, but it is no excuse for Taiwan to refuse discussion

Liang treats the Hong Kong experience as a "risk" that Taiwan society must guard against, but this is a deliberate distortion of Hong Kong. Any discussion of future institutional arrangements cannot avoid examining the observations and lessons arising from Hong Kong's governance practices. But studying Hong Kong does not mean simply equating Hong Kong with Taiwan; being alert to risks does not mean refusing to discuss how those risks can be avoided.

Resolving the Taiwan question and Hong Kong question are clearly different in terms of their historical backgrounds, social structures, institutional traditions, external environments, and the complexity of future arrangements. Precisely for this reason, a Taiwan solution cannot simply replicate any existing model. It must fully take into account the realities of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan region, listen carefully to views from all sectors on both sides of the Straits, and, more importantly, provide concrete and verifiable responses to the concerns of Taiwan society.

If Hong Kong is distorted by Taiwan society as a pretext for refusing to discuss institutional arrangements for Taiwan after reunification, it effectively means setting aside the very issues that concern Taiwan society most. The result can only be a situation in which risks are repeatedly emphasized while there is an unwillingness to participate in shaping the conditions needed to reduce those risks. This is not only a passive mindset; it also reflects the fantasy that the "status quo" can exist forever. True prudence means addressing risks fully, making red lines clear, and translating what cannot be accepted, what people hope to secure, and what safeguards are needed into institutional language that can be discussed and tested.

Taiwan society should be open to discussions on arrangements after reunification

There is another question that deserves particular attention: Taiwan authorities have long emphasized freedom of speech, so why are they so nervous about discussions among people on both sides of the Straits concerning institutional arrangements after reunification?

For Taiwan compatriots, national reunification is not an optional question but one that must be answered. Discussions about governance after reunification should allow residents in Taiwan to raise questions, exchange views and engage in debate. Regarding the specific content of a "one country, two systems" framework for Taiwan, some may support it while others may oppose it; some may propose conditions while others may criticize it point by point; some may emphasize rights protections while others may stress obligations and responsibilities. What matters is that the discussion should be grounded in facts, reason and rules, rather than having the space for discussion constrained by labels, stigmatization or predetermined conclusions.

Discussions among people on both sides of the Straits about a "one country, two systems" framework for Taiwan do not mean that either side has accepted any predetermined arrangement, nor do they mean that either side has abandoned its own position. First and foremost, they mean that a major issue that has long been treated in abstract and emotional terms is beginning to be broken down into concrete questions concerning rights, obligations, governance, security, people's livelihoods and institutional boundaries. 

Such discussion is itself worth cherishing.

What should truly be guarded against is the DPP authorities' attempt to seal Taiwan residents back inside an "information cocoon," deliberately creating misunderstanding and confrontation between people on both sides of the Straits and obstructing cross-Straits exchanges, interactions and efforts to build mutual understanding.

The topic of reunification cannot remain forever focused only on "what to oppose"

The future of cross-Straits relations and the broader trend toward national reunification will not stop simply because discussion is avoided.

The so-called "Mainland Affairs Council" is of course entitled to oppose such proposals and to point out the risks and conditions it considers unacceptable. But if it is truly confident in its position, it should provide a more comprehensive argument: Which institutional arrangements are contrary to the interests of Taiwan society? Which aspects of the so-called "historical experience" warrant concern? Which security risks must be prevented? What rights and safeguards does Taiwan society actually hope to secure, and what common responsibilities is it prepared to undertake? If it cannot provide substantive answers to these questions and instead merely repeats that something is "untrustworthy," "cannot be discussed" or "will never be accepted," then what it represents is merely a posture of refusing discussion, rather than a proposal capable of addressing the public's concerns about the future.

Reunification is not merely a slogan, and a "one country, two systems" framework for Taiwan cannot remain merely a slogan either. Only by clearly defining rights, responsibilities, red lines and safeguards can an abstract political proposition gradually be transformed into concrete, realistic arrangements that can be discussed. This is precisely the significance of discussions among people on both sides of the Straits. Their value does not lie in reaching consensus through a single debate, but in ensuring that neither side continues to judge the other based solely on assumptions, and that rights and responsibilities, expectations and concerns, as well as red lines and room for maneuver, have an opportunity to be placed on the table.

The response from the "Mainland Affairs Council" this time appears particularly lacking in confidence precisely because it failed to address these questions directly, instead attempting to end the discussion before it had even truly begun. At the same time, online discussions among people on both sides of the Straits about a "one country, two systems" framework for Taiwan are gaining momentum. This further demonstrates how out of step the response from the "Mainland Affairs Council" is with the views and aspirations of Taiwan residents. In the end, such a response can only become a historical laughingstock.